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Abstract
This paper estimates the hidden cost of informal redistribution in urban
Senegal. It is based on a lab-in-the-field experiment combined with a
small-scale randomized controlled trial. We show that two-thirds of the
experiment participants are ready to forgo up to 14% of their lab gains
to keep them private. When they are given the opportunity to hide, they
decrease by 27% the share of gains they transfer to kin and increase health
and personal expenses. This is the first paper to identify the individual cost
of informal redistribution and to relate it to real-life resource-allocation
decisions in a controlled setting.
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In developing countries, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, social norms of
redistribution are particularly prevalent. Individuals frequently transfer a sub-
stantial share of their income to members of their social networks, i.e. mem-
bers of the household or extended family, friends, and neighbors, (Baland et al.,
2015; di Falco and Bulte, 2011). This informal redistribution shape the social
and economic lives of individuals: people make resource-allocation choices ac-
counting not only for their personal socioeconomic condition but also for the
situation of members of their social networks (Platteau, 2000, 2006, 2014).
The economic literature has long focused on the risk-sharing dimension of in-
formal redistribution in economies where people have limited access to financial
markets and to formal redistribution, and are structurally vulnerable to income
shocks.1 Informal insurance mechanisms help people protect against certain
risks, in particular idiosyncratic ones, although full risk-sharing is almost never
achieved due to moral hazard and limited commitment issues (e.g., Coate and
Ravallion, 1993; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Fafchamps, 1992; Kimball, 1988).
However, interpersonal transfers are also linked to other motives, according to
anthropological and sociological literature: they can be driven by traditions, so-
cial prestige seeking , pure altruism, or well-internalized norms (e.g. Wright,
1994).
The potential adverse effects of this informal redistribution have found a grow-
ing recent interest in the economic literature. Akin to a taxation system, infor-
mal redistribution can lead to distortions in economic decisions. This kin tax
can induce direct disincentive effects on resource accumulation decisions, such
as labor supply or investment (Grimm et al., 2013; Hadness et al., 2013), and
indirect distortions in resource allocation choices (Baland et al., 2011; Boltz,
2015; di Falco and Bulte, 2011; Goldberg, 2013). The latter studies describe the
resource-allocation strategies people adopt to escape the pressure to redistribute,
often at a high cost: namely favoring non-easily-sharable assets, hasting some
expenses, and hiding income sources and easily-shared resources.
In this paper, we aim to measure the individual cost2 of social pressure to re-
1For a review, see Cox and Fafchamps (2007)
2We refer here to gross costs. Our paper does not allow for a net welfare analysis, as we are
not able to measure the potential benefits from this informal redistribution in this analysis, such
as the potential scope for informal insurance as stressed above. Including this dimension in the
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distribute. We hence tackle the three subsequent questions. First, who is trying
to escape these social obligations to redistribute, and how much do they value
being able to relax these obligations? Second, how does it change people’s re-
source allocation choices when they are offered the opportunity to escape this
redistributive pressure? Third, from whom are people hiding, their household
members, their kin outside the household, or their neighbors? To answer these
questions, we conducted an experiment in Senegal that uniquely combines a ran-
domized controlled trial (RCT) and a lab experiment. We elicit preferences for
income privacy in a lab setting for a random sample of participants, and a week
later, we measure the effect of hidden income on resource allocation choices
made outside the lab.
Only a few papers in the economic literature have attempted to identify the dis-
tortive role of social norms of redistribution on resource allocation decisions in
a controlled experiment. Jakiela and Ozier (2015), using windfall income, ex-
plored how observability among volunteering participants from the same com-
munity in rural Kenya affects investment choices within the lab, and they show
that women with kin participating in the experiment were willing to hide more.
However, the paper does not look at how income observability affects non-
investment allocation choices out of the lab and the experiment suffers from
self-selection of the pool of participants and observers in the lab. Hadness et al.
(2013) investigate on a small sample of tailors in Burkina-Faso the effort level
they provide depending on whether their prospective income, earned following
a lucrative job opportunity offered by the experimenters, was public informa-
tion to their solidarity network or not. Finally, Beekman et al. (2015) in rural
Liberia show that individuals with more kin in the community are more likely
to hide a share of their gains, based on a lab-in-field experiment. However, they
only elicit the WTP to hide on a subset of participants3 and do not relate it to
investment or allocation decisions. Our work also relates to the literature on
intrahousehold non-cooperative behaviors that underlines a propensity to hide
resources within the household, notably Castilla and Walker (2012, 2013) in
Ghana and Ashraf (2009) in the Philippines.
analysis is a necessary future step and is part of our research agenda.
3In each household, the head or a spouse participated, depending on the decision made par
the selected household.
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Inspired by the pioneer experiments mentioned above, our main contribution
to the literature is to estimate the effect of redistributive pressure on real-life re-
source allocation decisions4 and to relate this effect to the individual willingness-
to-pay to escape informal redistribution. Specifically, we contribute to the liter-
ature in four dimensions. First, we elicit the willingness-to-pay to hide income
for all participants, not just for subjects in a specific treatment group. Prefer-
ences are elicited through choices incentivized by a subsequent lottery offering
the opportunity to keep part of their lottery gains unobserved from other partic-
ipants. This enables us to estimate the deadweight loss associated with redis-
tributive pressure for the whole sample and to test whether the effect of getting
the opportunity to hide is heterogeneous in ex ante preferences for privacy. Sec-
ond, we estimate the impact of the redistributive pressure on real-life decisions.
For this, we rely on the specific feature of our setting, which associates an RCT
with a lab experiment. We thus do not impose any structure of transfer or in-
vestment decisions in the lab setting and rather leave the participants free to
choose how to allocate their gains outside the lab. One week later, we observe
resource-allocation decisions out of the lab, for all participants, with an attrition
rate below 3%. Third, thanks to the random selection of participants at baseline,
we have an exogenous pool of participants, and thus of observers. In contrast
to most lab experiments in the field, which are based on voluntary participation,
our baseline survey enables us to control for the relatively low attrition between
the selection and the lab phase. Fourth, we build on the growing literature of
family economics aimed at analyzing economic decisions within the extended
family. Specifically, we draw a link between the literature on intrahousehold
non-cooperative behavior and the literature on the role of redistribution beyond
the household, within social networks. In our setting, we distinguish between
transfers made to individuals within or outside the household and we exoge-
nously selected either one or two participants per household in the baseline.
This enables us to identify the extent to which the overall results are affected by
redistribution between household members or across households.
We conducted the lab-in-the-field experiment in May and June 2014 in poor,
densely populated urban communities in the Dakar region, in Senegal on a final
4A limitation of our analysis is that we study the allocation of windfall gains. However, an
important result of our paper is that these windfall gains are found not to be allocated differently
than other sources of income, i.e. lottery gains are fungible.
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sample of 797 individuals. First, we find a high willingness-to-pay to escape
social obligations to redistribute among participants: 65% prefer to receive their
gains in private rather than in public, and they are ready to forgo on average 14%
of their unobserved income for privacy. Second, we show that the willingness-
to-pay to hide income is positively correlated with proxies for redistributive
pressure, proxies that differ across gender: women hide more the stronger their
position in their extended family, while men hide more the better off they are.
Third, we find evidence of strong distortions in resource allocation decisions
outside the lab due to the redistributive pressure, relying on the RCT component.
Among people fearing redistributive pressure, the ones who get the opportunity
to escape it, through income hiding, transfer 27% less to kin than the ones who
get everything in public. They spend this extra money on healthcare and private
goods (e.g. personal care, clothing). Women in poor households invest less of
their income when they are able and willing to hide, suggesting that investment
is a substitute strategy to gain more control over their resources and to transfer
less.
The question of the adverse effects of redistributive obligations is not specific
to Senegal. Platteau (2014) provides numerous references from the sociolog-
ical and anthropological literature describing the prevalence of redistributive
norms and of coping strategies — the strategy we analyze being one of the most
widespread — throughout Africa and more largely in all lineage-based societies.
Finally, by analyzing the linkages between social networks and resource alloca-
tion decisions in economies with prevalent redistributive norms and limited ac-
cess to formal financial markets, our paper highlights possible causes of poverty
traps in Sub-Saharan Africa. We point to the existence of large distortions in-
duced by redistributive pressure. Helping people gain more control over their
own resources appears crucial for avoiding such deadweight loss. Our study
provides strong evidence on how informal institutions shape economic behav-
iors, in the absence of formal financial markets and public redistribution. Our
results, and the new avenues for research they prompt, are all the more impor-
tant because people most affected by these informal arrangements appear to be
the most vulnerable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the
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experiment protocol, and Section 2 describes the experiment sample. In Section
3, we present the results for the estimation of the cost of informal redistribution,
through the elicited willingness-to-pay for income unobservability. We discuss
the results on the determinants of the willingness to pay in Section 4. The central
results of the impact of income hiding on resource allocation outside the lab
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 explores heterogeneity across wealth and
gender. Section 7 concludes.
1 Experiment Protocol
1.1 General setting
We conducted our experiment in May and June 2014, in seven different poor
urban communities in the department of Pikine, in Senegal’s Dakar region.5
We illustrate the different steps of the experiment in Figure 1 in the Online
Appendix. The experiment lasted approximately two weeks in each community.
The first week, we selected the sample and administered the household and
individual baseline questionnaires. The lab took place on the Sunday of the
same week. One week later, the enumerators went back to administer a short
follow-up questionnaire to the subjects.
1.2 Pre-lab sample selection
The baseline sample consisted of 947 individuals selected using a random-walk
sampling method.6 A household was selected if at least two members satis-
fied the eligibility criteria: being between 18 and 60 years old and having ever
earned some labor income.7 Once these criteria were verified, the enumerator
could start the household survey and proceed to the random selection of the
5We selected the communities enough apart so as to prevent any learning or overlap in sub-
ject populations.
6Each enumerator was assigned one or two blocks of dwellings and a starting point; he or
she had to follow a strict rule: only every other dwelling was preselected. If this dwelling had
only one floor, and if more than one household was living there, the enumerator would move
on to the household to the right of the entrance of the pre-selected dwelling. If a dwelling had
several floors, first the floor was randomly selected and then, the right-hand-side household rule
was followed.
7These two criteria were added to ensure that people were accustomed to managing some
resources and to make resource-allocation decisions. If these selection criteria were not satisfied,
the enumerator left the dwelling and resumed the random-walk procedure.
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player from among the pool of eligible household members. In order to ensure
no possible ex ante manipulation in the selection of participants, the enumera-
tor would not mention any lottery gain and would not proceed to the random
draw of the players before having established the complete roster of household
members.
We introduced an additional layer of heterogeneity in our study by randomly
varying the number of individuals selected per household: in every second
household, only one player was selected, while two players were selected in
the next household.8 This enabled us to introduce some exogenous variation in
the intrahousehold pressure for redistribution.
The household survey includes information on the household composition and
household expenditures. The individual questionnaire administered to each player
provides us with data on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, social
capital held in one’s kinship and community network, and personal assets and
expenditures. At this stage, interviewed individuals were invited at a given hour
on the following Sunday to continue the survey; they were informed that this
would involve only a few additional questions and small compensation for the
time spent with us.
1.3 Lab experiment design
The lab phase took place on the Sunday following the baseline interviews, in a
primary school within the community so as to minimize travel cost.9 In each
community, there were four sessions, at 9 a.m., 11 a.m., 1 p.m. and 3 p.m.
Players surveyed by the same enumerators, and therefore, from the same or
nearby dwelling blocks were assigned to the same sessions. On average 30
players were invited to the same session. Again, the players were not yet aware
of the lottery amounts.
Each session was split into three stages (see Point 2 in Figure 1 in the Online
Appendix). First, all participants from the same session were gathered in the
same large room, and could observe each other. At this stage, they learned
8As indicated above, to be eligible, a household had to contain at least two eligible members
so that one-player households and two-player households are comparable.
9Subjects had to walk five to ten minutes to get to the school.
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that they could gain at least 1000 CFA francs (FCFA) and up to 9000 FCFA if
they agreed to pursue the interview with us. To put these amounts in context,
in this sample, 527 FCFA is the average daily per capita food expenditure and
the average household comprises 11 members.10 Second, subjects who agreed
to stay were invited one by one for a private interview in one of eight small
rooms, based on the order of subjects’ arrival at the lab session. They were
asked to make a set of choices between private and public gains in order to
to reveal their preference for income unobservability. The subsequent lottery
made these choices incentive-compatible, since the choices were definitive and
could potentially determine the outcome of the lottery.11 Third, after all private
interviews took place, all subjects were gathered again in a large room, where
all public payoffs were declared and distributed in front of all participants.
Each private interview was composed of three main steps (see Point 3 in Figure
1 in the Online Appendix). The first part is devoted to questions on identifying
other participants at the session he or she knows and what his or her relationships
are with those people. The second step concerns the elicitation of preferences
for private income. Third, the lottery takes place, implementing potentially pre-
vious choices. If the drawn card entailed some private gains, the enumerators
gave them to the participant during the private interview so as to ensure unob-
servability by other participants. We describe in details the last two steps in the
subsequent two subsections.
Elicitation of preferences for income unobservability
The enumerator explained the rules of the lottery game, reading first the “con-
sent”,12 in French or in Wolof, the dominant local language.13 Just before the
elicitation of the player’s preference for income unobservability, he or she was
shown all the potential cards he or she could draw from the lottery box (Point
10The average per capita food expenditure for one day in the department of Pikine is 465
FCFA, and the average household size is 13, according to the "Poverty and Family Structure"
survey, a nationally representative survey of Senegal collected in 2006 (DeVreyer et al., 2008).
Thus we selected slightly richer-than-average households or communities.
11Participants are told that if they choose not to continue to participate, they would receive
500 FCFA publicly at the end of the session.
12The French and Wolof consents are available upon request.
13Subjects who spoke neither French nor Wolof, were given a translated version of the consent
in their mother tongue as well.
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4 in Figure 1). The participant learned that no matter her and his choices in the
preferences’ elicitation and the draw in the lottery, he or she would receive at
least 1000 FCFA in public. The player was also told that he or she may receive
more in public or in private. The enumerator carefully explained each card, es-
pecially the two types of cards: the “option cards” and the “no-option cards”.
The gains associated with the latter were independent of the participant’s pref-
erences: each of the three cards specifies receiving respectively 1000 FCFA in
public and nothing in private, 9000 FCFA in public and nothing in private, or
1000 FCFA in public and 8000 FCFA in private. Conversely, the gains associ-
ated with the “option cards” would follow the choices participants were about to
make about their preferences for income privacy. The no-option with only 1000
FCFA in public and nothing in private is crucial in the design because it made
impossible any inference about who chose to hide: everybody knew that some
“unlucky” people got 1000 FCFA in public and nothing in private, regardless of
their preferences for income unobservability. This card thus protected the pri-
vacy of participants’ choices — about income privacy. Enumerators took care to
make this point clear; however, had a participant not understood this, we would
bias his or her willingness-to-pay to hide downward, since she or he would not
pay for the privacy.
To elicit preferences for income unobservability, we relied on a multiple-choice-
list method. Each subject was asked to make a series of choices illustrated
by the option cards. The various choices are shown in Table 1. Each card
presented two options: option A corresponds to receiving 9000 FCFA in public,
i.e. in the presence of the other participants of the session, while option B
means receiving 1000 FCFA in public and 8000 FCFA minus some varying
amount p, where p, the price of the income-hiding option, equals either 0, 200,
500, 700 or 1000 FCFA; the payoffs for option B amount to 9000 FCFA minus
p. Each choice, i.e. for each value of p, was offered one after the other, in
ascending order, until reaching 1000 FCFA, no matter what the previous answer
was. The enumerator made clear that some of these cards were in the ballot box,
meaning that each choice the subject made would potentially be implemented
after the lottery.14 For subjects showing multiple switches, the enumerators
14After the lottery draw, if the subject did not agree on her previous choice, he or she could
leave the room with 500 FCFA.
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re-explained the questions and the stakes of the choices; if they changed their
initial choices, the revised choices in addition to the initial ones were recorded.
Choosing A for the first choice when p = 0 indicated a strong preference for
income observability. For subjects ready to pay up to 1000 FCFA to get only
1000 FCFA in public, the enumerator asked the maximum amount the player
was ready to forgo in order to get the minimum in public.
Table 1: Elicitation of preference for income unobservability: “option cards”
Option A Option B
Public Private Total p Public Private Total
Choice 1 9000 0 9000 0 1000 8000 9000
Choice 2 9000 0 9000 200 1000 7800 8800
Choice 3 9000 0 9000 500 1000 7500 8500
Choice 4 9000 0 9000 700 1000 7300 8300
Choice 5 9000 0 9000 1000 1000 7000 8000
Lottery and payoffs distribution
After the participant made all his or her choices, the enumerator explained again
that all no-option cards and some of the option cards were in the lottery box,
and if drawn, the player’s decisions will be implemented. For budget and power
constraints, only two “option cards” were actually put in the box, the ones with
p = 200 and p = 700. However, this information was not revealed to subjects:
the enumerators only told them that some of the option cards were in the lottery
box. The different cards included in the ballot box are presented in Table 2.
Participants did not know about the actual distribution of cards, so they could
not infer how many people had actually chosen to hide when the public payoffs
were distributed.
The ex ante distribution of cards in the lottery box was fixed: in each session,
there were five no-option cards with 1000 FCFA in public, seven no-option cards
with 9000 FCFA in public, eight no-option cards with 1000 FCFA in public and
8000 FCFA in private, nine option cards with the hiding price p set at 200 FCFA,
and eight option cards with the hiding price p set at 700 FCFA.15
15However, since participation varied from one location to another and from one session
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Table 2: Cards in the ballot box and their associated payoffs
Type of cards Cards Option Public gain Private gain Total
Option cards Private p200,O A: Public 9000 0 9000
B: Private 1000 7800 8800
Private p700,O A: Public 9000 0 9000
B: Private 1000 7300 8300
No-option cards Private f ree,NO - 1000 8000 9000
LowPublicNO - 1000 0 1000
HighPublicNO - 9000 0 9000
All gains are given in FCFA. 1000 FCFA ≈ 1.5 EUR.
“O” stands for option card (i.e., based on the choices made ex ante) and “NO” stands for
no-option card (i.e., not based on the choices made ex ante).
A Private card gives the opportunity to hide, either based on the previously chosen option, at
a price p200 or p700 (200 and 700 FCFA, respectively) or at no cost, f ree, and independently
of the previous choices. A Public card gives all the gains in public.
Low refers to small gains, 1000 FCFA. High refers to high gains, 9000 FCFA. All Private
cards are high gains.
Once everything was explained and understood, the subject drew a card from
the lottery box. If it was an option card, the enumerator recalled the subject’s
previous choice and asked the subject whether he or she still agreed with his
or her previous choice, indicating that the alternative was receiving 500 FCFA
in public. The private gains were distributed in the private room in a separate
envelope. A ticket was given to the subject stating the amount he/she would
receive in public, either 1000 FCFA or 9000 FCFA. By design, all participants
received at least 1000 FCFA in public.
We made clear to the enumerators and to the subjects that subjects were totally
free to use their money as they wanted to. No explicit or implicit declaration
was made so as to influence their answers in the lab or their choices out of the
lab. After the private interview, subjects were then invited to wait in a separate
large room until everyone had finished.16 Once each interviewee had played,
the public gains were disclosed to the assembly and distributed publicly.
to another, the final distribution of drawn cards is slightly different from the distribution in
the lottery box. This difference is nevertheless totally random. Moreover, since the private
interviews took place simultaneously in eight rooms, the 37 cards were distributed randomly in
eight small lottery boxes in front of all participants when they were all gathered in room prior
to the private interviews.
16 On average, a session lasted one and a half hour, with a maximum of two hours.
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1.4 Post-lab survey
A novel feature of our experiment design is that we did not force any in-the-
lab transfers. In order to measure the impact of the observability of personal
gains by other participants on transfers and resource-allocation decisions, we
analyzed spending decisions made outside the lab. One week later, we visited
the subjects to administer a short additional questionnaire on the expenditures
and events of the past week. At the end of the survey, we asked an open question
about how they allocated the payoffs of the gains.17 We made sure we identify
the recipient of transfers made by the participant, in particular if the former was
a household member, a kin or a non-kin.
2 Experiment Sample
2.1 Sample description
Table 8 in the Appendix describes the sample of individuals that attended the
experiment phase (thereafter, the “lottery sample”), and tests whether baseline
characteristics are balanced across the cards giving the opportunity to hide, “pri-
vate cards”, and cards with no opportunity to hide “public cards”.
In the sample, two-thirds of the players were women.18 The average age was 37
years. Household heads accounted for 20% of the sample, while spouses and
children of the head represented each a quarter of the distribution. Two-thirds
of the subjects were married, including 18% in a polygynous union. One-fifth
of the sample had no education and 40% contributed to the food expenditures of
their households. The informal sector represented 86% of the last or current jobs
held. Overall, most variables were not significantly different accross groups, but
some differences remained – ethnicity, marital status, having a responsability
in the community, and risk aversion – that we control for in the subsequent
17Enumerators wrote the answer to this question literally; the answer was coded only after
the survey. Special attention was paid to not influencing any answer from the respondent and to
making sure each answer was correctly coded.
18Great care was given to including both men and women in the sample. This is why all the
experimental sessions took place on Sundays and enumerators were flexible about when to fill
the baseline questionnaire – coming back when people, mostly men, were coming back from
work, or very early in the morning before they left the house.
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empirical analysis.
2.2 Distribution of treatment and control groups
Table 9 in the Appendix presents the final distribution of drawn cards: 352 of
797 subjects, i.e. 44.2%, received a share of their payoffs in private, either
based on their previously elicited preferences (Privatep200,O, Privatep700,O) or
not (Private f ree, NO).19 The number of subjects who drew a public card at 1000
FCFA, LowPublicNO, is smaller than the others since its primary role was to
make sure that people could not infer whether players chose to hide or truly
only received 1000 FCFA, as explained above. Players who drew a card with
the possibility to hide for p = 200 FCFA (respectively p = 700 FCFA) had
expressed a willingness-to-pay larger than 200 FCFA (respectively 700 FCFA)
in 57% of the cases (respectively, 49%), which means that they accepted to
hide at this price (see Table 10). We observe only a very slight decrease in the
demand for income unobservability between the two price levels.
2.3 Attrition between the pre-lab interview and the lab phase
Table 14 in the Online Appendix describes the attrition between the baseline and
the lottery sample. The attrition rate is 13%. Individuals who did not come to the
lottery lived in smaller and richer households (in terms of daily food expendi-
ture), with a relatively larger share of adult members. They were more likely to
be single men who were not selected with another member of the household.20
They were more educated, more likely to work in the formal sector. We account
for these differences throughout the rest of the analysis.
2.4 Attrition between the lab phase and post-lab interview
Attrition between the lab phase and the post-lab survey was very low: only 25
individuals were lost, representing 3% of the lottery sample. The main reason
(16 observations) is that those people were traveling out of the Dakar region the
19In Table 9, we removed 19 inconsistent observations, in terms of preferences. These obser-
vations are also dropped in the subsequent tables and analyses.
20Part of this attrition among pairs comes from the fact that no delay or report to the next
session was tolerated for paired individuals in order to be sure to have the two paired individuals
attending the same session.
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week after the lab phase and not reachable for a face-to-face interview. Table
15 in the Online Appendix compares the characteristics of the attrited players
(column 2) and the non-attrited ones (column 3). The two groups are similar.
Players who earned only 1000 FCFA publicly were, however, less likely to be
reinterviewed.21
3 Estimation of the cost of informal redistribution
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) for unobservable income can be directly recov-
ered from the responses during the lab, before the lottery. It can be inferred
from the choices made at each price p ∈ {0,200,500,700,1000} and from the
question asked to people who were ready to pay 1000 FCFA, “What is the max-
imal amount you are ready to pay out of 9000 FCFA to get only 1000 FCFA in
public and the remaining in private ?”. This allows us to capture the maximal
willingness to pay, even for individuals with very high preferences for income
unobservability.22
Statistics of the elicited WTP to hide income in the lab are shown in Table 3.
23 The first three columns of the table present the results for the whole sample,
while we condition the sample on the participants who showed a positive or null
WTP to hide in the last 3 columns. For both samples considered, we distinguish
between men and women. The rationale for this is that women and men have
generally separate social networks, they do not interact within the same groups,
the pressure to redistribute may thus also come from different groups.24 We also
find it interesting to ponder whether these measures are different among worse-
21This is not worrisome to our study since as mentioned above, this group mainly served in
the lab phase to protect people choosing to keep a share of their income unobservable from
being identified as doing so by other participants.
22During the pilot phase, the take-up for p= 200 was 40% and 22% for p= 500 ; therefore,
we chose to range prices from 0 to 1000 FCFA. However, the results of the experiment show
that we could have asked for higher prices. Our results are hence rather a lower bound of the
WTP for income unobservability given our framing.
23The full distribution of the WTP to hide is shown in Figure 2 in the Online Appendix for
the individuals with a positive WTP to hide income. Note a WTP equal to 0 on the graph means
that the individual prefers hidden income over public income when the choice is free; however
he or she is not ready to pay 200 FCFA or more.
24For qualitative evidence in Senegal, see (Guerin, 2008) and (Moya, 2004); for quantitative
evidence in Madagascar and Ghana, see Nordman and Vaillant (2014) and Castilla and Walker
(2013) respectively.
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Table 3: Measures of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) to hide income
Whole sample Sample with WTP ≥ 0
All players Women Men All players Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: whole sample
Number of observations 788 534 254 512 345 167
Mean (in FCFA) 708 643 845 1089 994 1285
Median (in FCFA) 600 500 1000 1000 1000 1000
Std. Dev. 874 783 1026 871 774 1019
Panel B: < median of household daily food expenditures per cap.
Number of observations 400 272 129 259 177 82
Mean (in FCFA) 689 650 764 1063 999 1202
Median (in FCFA) 500 500 1000 1000 1000 1000
Std. Dev. 938 954 900 980 1025 864
Relative WTP† 2.28 2.14 2.52 3.54 3.34 3.97
Panel C: ≥ median of household daily food expenditures per cap.
Number of observations 402 271 130 266 176 90
Mean (in FCFA) 776 652 1040 1173 1005 1502
Median (in FCFA) 700 500 1000 1000 1000 1000
Std. Dev. 1067 750 1502 1121 716 1602
Relative WTP† 1.18 1.12 1.34 1.80 1.72 1.97
Test difference in relative WTP - Panels B vs C (P-Val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1000 FCFA ' 1.5 EUR ' 1.7 USD
Taking a conservative approach, the WTP statistics are computed at the lower bound of the price interval. For example if a
participant is ready to pay 200 FCFA but not 500 FCFA, her maximum WTP is registered as being equal to 200 FCFA.
The median daily household food expenditure per capita is 420 FCFA.
† Relative WTP corresponds to the ratio of the WTP to hide income to the household daily food expenditures per capita.
The difference of the average WTP between men and women is significant at a 5% level.
off and better-off individuals; in other words, do more financially constrained
individuals face different levels of redistributive pressure? Panels B and C in
Table 3 show the WTP statistics for individuals below and above the median of
household daily food expenditures per capita.
The average WTP to hide is 708 FCFA for the whole sample, 643 FCFA for
women and 845 FCFA for men, the difference being significant at the 5% level.
The median of the WTP to hide is 600 FCFA for the whole sample, 500 FCFA
for women and 1000 FCFA for men. Sixty-five percent of players were willing
to hide at a zero price; this rate is similar for men and women. Conditional on a
positive WTP to hide, half of the sample of both men and women was ready to
pay up to 1000 FCFA to have only 1000 FCFA in public and the remainder in
private. On average, the WTP is 1089 FCFA, i.e. 13.6% of the gains that could
be hidden, this share being smaller for women (11.8%) than for men (16.1%).
Assuming that preference for income unobservability reflects the implicit tax
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rate people will face on their observable revenues, the observed WTP is really
high.
Moreover, Panels B and C show that men whose daily food consumption is
above the median are willing to pay more than those below the median. In
contrast, women below and above the median have exactly the same WTP to
hide, at both the mean and the median.
Going one step further, we provide an additional measure of the redistributive
pressure by reporting the relative WTP computed as the ratio of the WTP to
the household daily food expenditure. Looking at Panels B and C, we see that
individuals living in poorer households reveal levels of WTP that are twice as
large as those living in richer households, in both men and women samples.
Hence, the redistributive tax rate appears strongly regressive, poorer individuals
facing a relatively higher redistributive burden.25
4 Who is willing to hide? The determinants of the
WTP to hide income
4.1 Empirical strategy
We estimate the determinants to the WTP to hide, using as a dependent variable
the maximum price people declared to be willing to pay to have revenue partly
unobservable. However, we observe only the interval in which this maximum
price lies, for individuals with a WTP to hide smaller than 1000 FCFA.26 There-
fore, we run an interval-censored-data regression model,27 where the dependent
variable is the price intervals implied by each question in the experiment28:
25This relationship is also verified when looking at all percentiles of daily food expenditures,
see Figure 3 in the Online Appendix.
26Individuals with a WTP to hide income larger than 1000 FCFA were asked to state the
maximum price they are willing to pay to have only 1000 FCFA disclosed in public. We use
this question to increase the precision of our estimates. Results are robust to the use of this extra
information or to treat them as right-censored.
27An interval-data regression is similar to an ordered probit, except that here the interval
boundaries are known. See Cameron and Trivedi (2010) (pages 548-550), for a discussion on
the differences among censored and interval data models.
28Subjects who prefer having their payoffs observable even at a null price, we assume that
they have a preference for income observability, subsequently a WTP to keep income observ-
able, namely a negative price p ∈ [−∞,0[.
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]−∞;0[ ; [0;200[ ; [200;500[ ; [500;700[ ; [700;1000], for individuals with a WTP
below 1000 FCFA and their true WTP otherwise. Let p= X ′β +εi be the model
we want to estimate. p is the vector of maximum price individuals are willing
to pay to hide income: it is a continuous outcome, even if not observed on a
continuum. Our model assumes ε ∼N (0,σ2I). For observations i whose price
pi ≤ 1000, pi is observed in intervals, i.e., we know only that the true unob-
served pi lies in the interval [p1i, p2i[, where the list of intervals was given just
above.
Finally, to investigate determinants of the extensive margin of preference for
hidden income, we estimate a logit model. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the player is willing to hide, i.e., has a positive WTP, and to 0
otherwise. We cluster the standard errors at the session level. The idea is to
test whether the extensive margin is predicting most of the determinants for the
WTP to hide. This will be important to back up the empirical strategy developed
in Section 6, in which we explore the differential impact of hidden income on
resource allocation between individuals with preference for hidden income and
individuals with no such preference.
4.2 Experimental variations in the pool of observers of the
gains
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the effect of the exogenous experimen-
tal variations of the group composition on the WTP to hide income.29 Panel A
shows the estimation results of the interval-censored-data regression model of
the determinants to the WTP to hide income. Panel B concerns the results of
the logit estimation on the dummy variable, taking 1 whether the individual has
a positive WTP, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) is estimated on the whole sam-
ple, columns (1w) and (1m) on the respective subsamples of female and male
players.
29The composition of the group of participants is exogenous by design of the experiment
since the participants were selected randomly. However, individuals with more kin living in the
community may end up with a higher probability to have any kin in the same session. Neverthe-
less, conditional on having any kin in the neighborhood at baseline, having a kin attending the
session is exogenous. Thus, we control for the former variable of the baseline in the subsequent
analysis.
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Table 4: The effects of the experimental group composition on the WTP to
hide income
Interval-censored & Logit regressions
All Women Men
(1) (1w) (1m)
Panel A: Interval-censored estimation on the WTP to hide (in FCFA)†
Male 191.6∗
(105.4)
Selected in household pair −20.2 −122.8 90.8
(111.8) (120.6) (215.6)
Any known non-kin in the session −14.6 −93.6 87.9
(148.5) (130.9) (331.3)
Any kin in the session (excl. household pairs) 285.0∗∗ 450.8∗∗∗ −227.1
(131.7) (133.3) (306.7)
Mean of the WTP to hide (in FCFA) 732.4 651.2 902.7
Number of observations 771 524 247
AIC 7514.2 4916.9 2593.8
Test Chi-2 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Logit estimation on the dummy, willing to hide (Yes/No)‡
Male 0.024
(0.041)
Selected in household pair −0.006 −0.004 −0.057
(0.039) (0.045) (0.071)
Any known non-kin in the session 0.027 −0.018 0.130+
(0.042) (0.058) (0.080)
Any kin in the session (excl. household pairs). 0.106∗ 0.190∗∗∗ −0.059
(0.057) (0.059) (0.085)
Mean of the dummy, willing to hide 0.65 0.65 0.66
Number of observations 771 524 247
Test Chi-2 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
s.e. clustered at the session level in (); +p< 0.12,∗ p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
Panel A: Interval-censored data regression model; † Dependent variable: maximum price
p willing to pay to hide. It is observed in intervals for a price p ≤ 1000 FCFA:
{ ]−∞;0[ ; [0;200[ ; [200;500[ ; [500;700[ ; [700;1000[}. The exact price is observed for price above
1000 FCFA (specific question).
Panel B: Logit model (average marginal effects); ‡ Dependant variable : dummy equal to 1 if the
WTP is positive
Controls: complete set of controls shown in Tables 17 and 18 for respectively the interval-censored
and the logit estimations.
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Looking at the interval-censored model, in Panel A of Table 4, coefficients rep-
resent the additional price people are willing to pay. We find that men are willing
to pay on average 192 FCFA more than women for income privacy. Moreover,
looking at columns (1w) and (1m), it appears clearly that men and women do
not share the same determinants of their WTP to hide income. Therefore, we fo-
cus hereafter on the discussion about these two specifications. A first remark is
that the effect of being selected along with another household member is never
significant, for either men or women.
For men, we find no significant effect from the experimental variations of the
group composition of a lab session on the maximum price they were willing to
pay (Panel A of Table 4). However, in Panel B, we find that at the extensive
margin, men were more likely to be willing to hide when there was at least one
known non-kin in the same session: this increased their probability to hide by 13
percentage points (although the effect is only significant at 12%). This suggests
that men are fearing more redistributive pressure from non-kin neighbors than
from kin.
For women, the variable indicating that at least one kin attended the same ses-
sion than the player (other than the player’s potential paired household member)
significantly increased the WTP to hide income. Given our experimental design,
a kin who attended the same session lives in the same community but does not
belong to the player’s household. Hence, having at least one non-household-
member kin attending the lab increased the WTP by 450 FCFA for women,
whereas having a household member participating in the session had no signif-
icant impact, though the sign is negative. In Panel B, we also find for women
that the presence of at least one kin in the same session increased the probability
to be willing to hide income by 19 percentage points.
In Table 18 in Online Appendix C, we explore the heterogeneity of this effect
between poorer and richer households by estimating the interval-censored data
model on the samples below and above the median of household daily food ex-
penditures per capita for all and for women.30 The presence of a non-household
member kin in the session increases the willingness to pay to hide for women
30The smaller sample size for men does not allow us to look at the subsamples of men below
and above the median food consumption.
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below and above the median of household food consumption of a close amount
(respectively, + 406 and + 380 FCFA).
4.3 Other determinants
Tables 17 and 18 in the Online Appendix C present the results for all the covari-
ates of the interval-censored data model respectively on the whole sample and
on the subsamples (except men) below and above the median household food
consumption. Results of the logit estimation for all covariates are presented in
Table 19 in Online Appendix C; they are similar to the previous model and are
not further discussed here.
For women, the characteristics correlated with a higher WTP to hide income
are closely linked to the position they hold in their extended family and their
community (see Table 17, column (1w)). Besides the experimental variation
variables we already mentioned, a woman who has always been living in the
community is willing to pay 380 FCFA more. Having always lived in the
community implies that she may have had longer interactions with members
of the community and potentially extended family members. Concerning her
economic situation, a woman’s labor income is positively correlated with the
WTP to hide. These two last effects are driven by the sample of women from
poorer households (see column (1w) in Table 18). A possible interpretation is
that women who earn labor revenues and who have always lived in the neigh-
borhood are more at risk to be asked for transfers, and this is more true for the
ones living in the poorest households.
In addition, women in poorer households who work in the formal sector, mean-
ing that they have stable revenues, decrease their WTP by 462 FCFA. This im-
plies that the result on earnings explained above is mainly driven by women
working in the informal sector for whom earnings are more instable and less
visible and therefore hiding their income can be a strategy for smoothing their
own consumption. An alternative interpretation could be that if working in the
formal or informal sector is a matter of choice, female formal workers may be
women who fear less having more visible and stable income and thus being
“taxed”.
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Regarding the individual position in the household, being the household head
or the spouse of the head increases the WTP by 435 FCFA and 274 FCFA,
respectively. The only negative and significant variable in Table 17 is the share
of dependent household members (the elderly and children): a woman living
with her husband and her two children is willing to pay 395 FCFA less than a
woman living only with her husband.
Determinants of the WTP to hide income for men fall into two broad dimen-
sions: on the one hand, characteristics related to the economic position, — a
better economic position is correlated with a higher WTP—, and on the other
hand, having a good social position in the community correlates with a lower
WTP. Regarding the social dimension, holding a responsibility in the commu-
nity31 induces a WTP 1316 FCFA lower. Men choosing a responsibility within
the community level have either a higher preference for redistribution or a higher
internalized redistributive duty. Alternatively, they may fear less being observed
possibly because they have more control over their resources or access to alter-
native strategies allowing them to avoid taxation. Looking at proxies for eco-
nomic status, we see that being single or being the child of the household head,
i.e., being financially responsible for fewer people, encourages men to increase
their WTP to hide income by 528 FCFA and 399 FCFA, respectively. Also a
higher daily food expenditure is linked with a higher WTP. Renting a house,
often correlated with a weaker economic situation, is associated with a decrease
of the WTP by 422 FCFA: this suggests that poorer men are less ready to forgo
some money to keep income unobservable.
5 The impact of income hiding on resource-allocation
decisions
In this section we estimate the distortions in resource allocation choices induced
by redistributive obligations. To do so, we test whether individuals with a share
of hidden gains are making different real-life choices of consumption or trans-
fers than the ones with observable gains.
31Among individuals who have a responsibility within the community, 21% are responsible
for a “tontine” (ROSCAS) (women : 39%, men 0%), 35% are responsible of an association,
other than a tontine (women : 25%, men : 48% ), and 44% have another kind of responsibility
(women : 36%, men 52%).
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5.1 Empirical model and identification strategy
We estimate the following system of equations for each commodity type g:
Yig = α+β PrivateCardi +X ′ig γ+µc+µs+uig (5.1)
where Yig represents the share of the lottery gains dedicated to good g by in-
dividual i as reported by the individual one week after the lottery (we discuss
below the outcomes below). Our key variable of interest, PrivateCard, takes
1 when the subject draws a card giving him or her the opportunity to hide. A
PrivateCard leads to actually hidden income, either regardless of the prefer-
ences for private income when the no-option card, Tf ree, NO is drawn, or con-
ditionally on the previously stated preferences when either of the two option
cards is drawn, Tp200,O; Tp700,O. The estimated coefficient β thus represents
the Intention-to-Treat effect of private gains since not all subjects who drew a
“private card” were willing to hide and thus actually did. µc and µs correspond,
respectively, to fixed effects of the community and of the hour of the attended
session. Xig is a set of controls including sociodemographic and economic char-
acteristics of the individual and his/her household, as well as some measure of
his/her position in the kinship and in social networks in the community.32 As
this set of expenditure shares are correlated at the individual level (each share
can be written as one minus the sum of all other shares), the error terms, uig in
the regression equations are correlated, and we estimate the system through a
seemingly unrelated OLS regression (SUR) system.
Going one step further, we also investigate the heterogeneity of this effect across
preferences for income privacy. Indeed, we expect the opportunity to hide to fa-
vor some expenses that could be constrained for individuals subject to a high
redistributive pressure within his or her network. If the WTP to hide income
is positively correlated to this redistribution pressure, the effect of the “private
card” should be driven by the subsample of participants with preferences for
privacy. We therefore estimate equation (5.1) on the subsamples of individu-
als with positive WTP to hide income and of individuals with no or negative
32The full set of controls is listed in Table 5.
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WTP to hide income.33 We further test for heterogeneity in the impact of the
opportunity to hide across the two groups of WTP (positive or strictly negative)
by interacting the variable PrivateCard with a dummy taking 1 when the indi-
vidual has a positive WTP to hide income. Thus, we estimating the following
equation:
Yig = α+β1 PrivateCardi +β2 1(WTP≥0)i
+β3 PrivateCardi ∗1(WTP≥0)i +X ′igγ+µc+µs+ εig (5.2)
where 1(WTP≥0) is a dummy variable that takes 1 when the player has a positive
WTP to hide income. In this specification, our parameter of interest is α3 which
tests the difference of the effect of the opportunity to hide between subjects with
positive and negative preferences for income hiding. In this specification, the
coefficient above the interaction term is the parameter of interest and tests the
difference of the effect of the opportunity to hide between subjects with positive
and negative preferences for income hiding.
Identification
Identification of the effect of the PrivateCard in model (5.1) on the whole sam-
ple totally relies on the randomness of the opportunity to hide in the lottery.
Concerning the estimation of the same model on the subsamples of individuals
with positive and negative WTP to hide and of model (5.2), the identification of
the effect relies on the exogeneity of the opportunity to hide in the lottery draw
for a given preference. In other words, we posit that, conditional on a given
ex ante stated preference, the likelihood to pick up a private card is random.
Table 20 in Appendix D shows that the probability to draw a card allowing to
hide gains is not correlated with preference for hiding income, regardless of the
inclusion of community, session, or enumerator fixed effects.
33Table 22 in Online Appendix D presents the results looking at different levels of prices, 0,
200, and 700 FCFA — the prices that were on the cards in the lottery box. We see that the effect
(in absolute value) of the opportunity to hide on transfers to kin is globally increasing between a
WTP to hide at 0 and at 700 FCFA, though the coefficient decreases slightly between 0 and 200
FCFA. However, globally the different coefficients are not statistically different from each other.
We observe a similar pattern on the personal expenditures. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity,
we focus on the dichotomy between negative and positive WTP to hide income in the remaining
results, which guarantees also the largest samples.
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In all specifications, we exclude individuals who got only 1000 FCFA in public
and nothing in private; therefore, the possible lottery gains are 8300, 8700, and
9000 FCFA. We do not control for the lottery windfall income as certain values
— 8300 and 8700 FCFA — are obtained only when the WTP to hide income is
positive. We thus assume here that the shares of the lottery gains allocated to
the various commodities are not directly affected by the windfall-income-level
differences — at most 700 FCFA– - but are directly affected by preferences for
hidden income and the random opportunity to hide. We test for this assumption
in Section 5.3.1 by restricting the analysis to the subsample of subjects who
randomly won exactly 9000 FCFA.
Outcome variables: lottery-gains allocation choices
We define eight types of commodities. Private goods encompass personal ex-
penses that exclusively concern the lottery winner, such as personal care or
clothes. Health expenditures account for all health expenditures made by the
individual — both for himself/herself or for someone else. We also consider
expenditures that benefit part or all of the household, distinguishing between
food expenses — contribution to the usual food pot or purchase of some extras,
e.g., candies, fruits, juices– and nonfood expenses — e.g., electricity bill and
detergent. Transfers are defined as money given by the lottery winner to another
individual with nothing directly or explicitly expected in return. We separate
transfers made to kin and non-kin; among the kin, we include transfers both
within the household and to kin outside the household. In Section 6, we refine
this definition and explore the differences between transfers to kin within and
outside the household . Productive investment accounts for any purchase made
for an economic activity, be it for direct resale or as an input for any income-
earning activity: for instance, for women it will often concern inputs they need
for some homemade preparations that they will sell on the street or in the mar-
ket. Finally, saved gains and other expenses correspond to gains that are not
used yet, those used to repaid loans and other expenses that we were not able to
categorized.
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5.2 Main results
Table 5 presents the results of the impact of income hiding on resource-allocation
choices for all participants.34 In Panel A, we show the results of model (5.1) es-
timating on the whole sample, the ITT effect of having drawn a “private card”,
namely a card giving the opportunity to hide income. In Panels B and C, we
estimate the same model, restricting it to the subsample of individuals with pos-
itive WTP to hide for Panel B and with negative WTP to hide for Panel C. In
Panel D, we estimate model (5.2), showing only the interaction term. Lastly,
in Panel E we present the unconditional means at the reference value, namely,
for individuals with “public cards” and with public cards and a positive WTP to
hide income.
Looking first at the unconditional means in Panel E, we observe that house-
hold food expenditures and transfers to kin account for the two largest shares
of expenses of the lottery gains: they represent respectively 26.6% and 21%
of gains for people with public cards (i.e., respectively 2385 and 1980 FCFA
out of 9000 FCFA). Transfers to non-kin are marginal in comparison. Hence,
resources clearly appear to be redistributed within one’s kinship networks and
only rarely beyond. Personal expenditures, and non-food household expendi-
tures each account for around one-tenth of the gains, while 17% of them are
assigned to productive investments. Public card winners spend almost 62% of
their gains on household expenses or on transfers. Comparing public card win-
ners with a positive and negative WTP, we find that public card winners with a
positive WTP to hide spend 11 percentage points more of their gains on trans-
fers to kin than individuals with the same card but negative WTP to hide. This
result reinforces the relevance of our measure of the WTP to hide: individuals
with a positive WTP are also those more subject to informal taxation.
5.2.1 Transfers
The central finding of our paper is the effect of the opportunity to hide on trans-
fers to kin: having the opportunity to hide decreases by 27% the share devoted
to transfers to kin, but only for individuals who prefer income privacy. Indeed,
34Table 21 in the Appendix shows the same results without any control, with only community
and session fixed effects.
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Table 5: Effect of the opportunity to hide lottery gains on allocation choices
Sample: all individuals
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A (N=654): Whole sample
Card with opportunity to hide 3.870 1.313 −0.748 −1.448 −2.714 0.432 −1.730 0.377
(2.092) (1.325) (3.028) (2.145) (2.263) (0.972) (2.716) (1.475)
R2 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.04
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.57
Panel B (N=433): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 5.188 2.912 1.407 −3.412 −6.560 1.413 −2.808 0.310
(2.689) (1.564) (3.625) (2.577) (2.780) (1.268) (3.373) (1.831)
R2 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.06
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.37
Panel C (N=221): WTP to hide† < 0
Card with opportunity to hide 2.998 −0.586 −5.211 1.080 5.138 −1.563 0.568 −0.854
(3.465) (2.558) (5.630) (3.978) (3.942) (1.514) (4.709) (2.547)
R2 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.13
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.05 0.65 0.19 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.22
Panel D (N=654): Testing heterogeneity across WTP to hide†
Card opportunity to hide ×WTP to hide ≥ 0‡ 4.008 3.776 4.391 −4.568 −10.711 2.566 −2.635 0.084
(4.428) (2.803) (6.414) (4.545) (4.790) (2.054) (5.758) (3.127)
R2 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.04
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.67
Panel E: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=164) 10.754 2.724 26.445 11.495 20.7 3.144 17.344 5.599
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 10.989 1.784 24.047 12.042 24.713 2.556 17.361 5.599
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=60) 10.347 4.352 30.601 10.548 13.742 4.164 17.314 5.599
S.e. in (). Panels A, B, C & D: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
‡ Panel D controls for main effects: WTP to hide and card with opportunity to hide lottery gains. The significant interaction term for transfers to kin is identified on the
reference group of 29 individuals who did not get the card with the opportunity to hide, were not willing to hide and did send transfers to kin.
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: in all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panel A and D: whole sample. Panel B (resp. C): sample with positive (resp.
negative) WTP to hide income.
Control variables common in all colums in Panels A to D: sex, age, has any kin in neighborhood (baseline), selected with another household member (baseline), household
head, spouse of household head, child of household head, religion, ethnicity, any Koranic education, any French or Arabic education, marital status, household size, share
of household members below 15 and above 60 years old, sector of activity, formal or informal salaried worker (i.e. not self-employed), average income over last 3 months
(in log), contributes to household food expenditures, household food expenditures per day per capita (in log).
Additional control variables in col. (2): suffers from an illness in baseline, amount of health care expenditures spent in the 7 days before the baseline (in log). Col. (5):
has any kin the lab session (excl. household pair). Col. (6): holds a responsibility in the community.
Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
we estimate a large decrease of 6.6 percentage points of total gains dedicated to
transfers to kin, significant at 5%, for individuals with a positive WTP to hide in
Panel B. No significant effect on transfers is found for the whole sample in Panel
A, and for individuals with a negative WTP to hide in Panel C, the sign being
even positive.35 For Panel B, this represents a decrease of 594 FCFA out of the
2224 FCFA transferred on average to kin by the reference group who drew a
public card and were willing to hide. Moreover, the difference in the effect of
the opportunity to hide between the individuals with positive and nonpositive
WTP to hide is large, –10.7 percentage points, and significant at 5% (Panel D).
35The sample of individuals with non positive WTP to hide is rather small, and we lack power
for estimating significant positive effect on this subsample.
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We find no significant effect on transfers to non-kin; if anything, for the ones
with a positive WTP to hide, the effect of being able to hide is a positive sign.
We can draw three main observations. First, this result shows that the WTP to
hide income captures well the willingness to avoid redistributive pressure since
the individuals who are willing to pay to hide are also the ones who decrease
the transfers when they have the opportunity to do so, and vice versa. Second,
even among individuals who are willing to hide and who are given the opportu-
nity to do so, we do not observe that they stop transferring totally, in fact they
still transfer 18% of their gains, i.e. about 1600 FCFA. This suggests that the
social obligations to redistribute people try to circumvent and for which they
are ready to pay a high price concern a quarter of the value of transfers (27%).
Since the transfers made by people willing to and able to hide exceed by 600
FCFA the observed 1000-FCFA gains, it is suggestive that people maintain cer-
tain transfers by pure altruism, or alternatively, as part of repetitive risk-sharing
arrangements. Third, it is important to notice that transfers to non-kin are not
affected by the opportunity to hide and they represent a share almost ten times
lower.
5.2.2 Personal expenditures and other outcomes
Almost symmetrically to the decrease in transfers, the share of the gains devoted
to personal expenditures is significantly increased. We found this for the whole
sample, the effect being larger in Panel B than in Panel C, though the difference
is not significant (Panel D). For Panel B, this effect is 5.2 percentage points,
accounting for an increase of 47% in the share of personal expenditures (465
FCFA). We also find weak evidence of an effect of the opportunity to hide for
the individuals willing to hide on health36 that again seems totally driven by
individuals with a positive WTP to hide income. Their health expenses are 1.6
times larger when they have the possibility to hide their lottery gains than when
they get everything in public.
In brief, the key result here is that exogenously allowing people to hide their
gains decreases considerably the share dedicated to transfers to kin. This de-
36The Chi-2 test has a p-value of 0.36, which is far from any standard level of significance.
However, the share devoted to health is small — 1.8 % in the reference group— meaning that
we may lack power to properly estimate this effect.
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crease in transfers allows to free up some resources for private expenditures, and
potentially on health. The result on transfers concerns exclusively subjects who
show ex ante preferences towards income privacy, meaning individuals more
subject to redistributive pressure. While the literature has more focused on in-
vestment as an outcome (e.g. Jakiela and Ozier, 2015), we find that people first
turn to expenditures with more immediate private returns when they are able to
decrease the redistributive pressure.
5.3 Alternative mechanisms
The results presented so far are discussed as the causal estimation of distortions
due to income observability on resource allocations. We discuss in turn alterna-
tive mechanisms and show that they are not driving our results.37
5.3.1 Testing the income effect
In the estimated models, we relied on the assumption that the maximum 700
FCFA difference between the subjects who earned 8300 FCFA and those who
earned 9000 FCFA is not large enough to induce different patterns in the shares
of expenditures. To test for this assumption and whether our results in Table
5 are not driven by this mechanism, we estimate the same equations as previ-
ously on the subsample of individuals who randomly drew the card C9000,NP or
Tf ree,NP. All of these individuals earned 9000 FCFA but some were randomly
awarded 8000 FCFA in private while others were not, all regardless of their ex
ante stated preferences. Hence, the comparison of these two groups is not af-
fected by the issue raised above, and the difference will capture only the effect
of having hidden income. Table 6 presents the results, which closely mirror
those found in Table 5, in both sign and magnitude. We find that the opportu-
nity to hide decreases by 5.5 percentage points38, significant at the 10% level
37An additional competing story might be an aversion to public attention: whether fear or
distaste of being publicly exposed, regardless of their income from the experiment. We think
that our experiment does not suffer from this. Indeed, an important feature of our experiment
is that everybody was publicly exposed in the lab and this was public information since the
beginning of the session. Each participant was named and given at least 1000 FCFA in public
even when they received some gains in private
38In a less demanding specification –i.e. without control variables, with only community and
session fixed effects –, we obtain a coefficient for transfers to kin of -6.6, which is exactly the
same as in Table 5. Results are available upon request.
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the shares of the gains devoted to transfers to kin for individuals with a positive
WTP to hide income in Panel B (the coefficient is –6.6 and significant at the
5% level in Table 5). Looking at the share of the gains dedicated to personal
expenditures, we find a positive effect of 5.2 percentage points in Panel B, like
in Table 5.From these results, we can conclude that resource allocation in terms
of shares is not affected by the small differential in income gains among some
participants.
Table 6: Testing the income effect: effect of hidden income among
9000-FCFA-gain winners
Sample of no-option cards: 9000F in public vs 1000F in public & 8000F in
private
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A (N=304): Whole sample
Card with opportunity to hide 3.632 1.161 −3.447 −0.564 −1.956 0.721 −1.082 0.897
(2.518) (1.492) (3.782) (2.737) (2.778) (1.279) (3.484) (1.817)
R2 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.11
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.03 0.82 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.11
Panel B (N=210): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 5.226 1.509 −0.747 −2.353 −5.518 1.965 −2.133 0.419
(3.109) (1.551) (4.410) (3.287) (3.289) (1.539) (4.049) (2.134)
R2 0.16 0.10 0.22 0.13 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.13
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.08 0.77 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.26
Panel C: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=164) 10.754 2.724 26.445 11.495 20.7 3.144 17.344 5.599
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 10.989 1.784 24.047 12.042 24.713 2.556 17.361 5.599
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=60) 10.347 4.352 30.601 10.548 13.742 4.164 17.314 5.599
S.e. in (). Panels A & B: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: in all panels, individuals who drew the no-option card 9000 FCFA in public or the no-option card 1000 FCFA in public and 8000 FCFA in private.
Panel A: whole sample. Panel B: sample with positive WTP to hide income.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors.
Community and time-of-session fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
5.3.2 Testing the fungibility of the gains with other income sources
An inherent limitation of our experiment is the nature of the windfall gains, as
opposed to effort-based income. True, there is a number of experimental studies
showing that people are less generous in dictator games when they first need
to earn their income, rather than when they receive a windfall payment (among
others, Cappelen et al., 2013; Cherry et al., 2002; Hoffman et al., 1994).
A first answer to this concern is that in this paper, we are not so much interested
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in the level of redistribution but rather in the difference in the level of redistribu-
tion between private and public gain earners. Therefore, under the assumption
that the pure windfall income effect is the same for private and public gains, the
fact that gains are not earned should not bias our results.
Moreover, we test the fungibility between the lottery gains and other income
earned by the players. Lottery gains would not be fungible in our context if
an increase in the expenditures of an item using lottery gains is compensated
by a decrease in the expenses for this item using the other income sources. In
presence of such substitution in the use of the two types of earnings, our pre-
vious results would hide general equilibrium effects that would cancel out our
estimated effects.
Table 7: Testing the fungibility of the gains: effect of the opportunity to hide
on the share of total income devoted to transfers
Sample: all individuals
Commodity shares Nontransfer consumption Transfers to kin Transfers to non-kin
Panel A (N=667): Whole sample
Card with opportunity to hide 4.065 −4.409 0.207
(2.157) (1.926) (1.025)
R2 0.07 0.09 0.04
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.44
Panel B (N=438): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 4.297 −6.076 2.011
(2.581) (2.273) (1.322)
R2 0.07 0.09 0.06
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.15 0.01 0.56
Panel C (N=229): WTP to hide† < 0
Card with opportunity to hide 3.908 −2.067 −2.748
(3.954) (3.490) (1.645)
R2 0.16 0.20 0.10
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.02 0.00 0.25
Panel D (N=667): Testing heterogeneity across WTP to hide†
Card opportunity to hide ×WTP to hide ≥ 0‡ 0.804 −4.126 4.306
(4.530) (4.041) (2.150)
R2 0.07 0.09 0.04
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.29
Panel D: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=164) 78.705 17.516 4.033
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 78.923 17.803 3.274
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=60) 78.328 17.018 5.348
Dependent var: Share of total post-lab income – labor income, received transfers and lottery gains – allocated to the various
commodities. One column per commodity. Panels A & B: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
Sample: in all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panel A: whole sample, Panel B:
sample with positive WTP to hide income.
Control variables: same as in Table 5.
Community fixed effects included in all panels.
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To discard this threat, we rely on our post-lab survey, in which we asked for
the labor income earned during the past seven days, but also the amounts for
the five largest transfers received and sent during this timeframe.39 We compute
the total earnings perceived over the past seven days by summing the declared
labor income, the received transfers, and the lottery gains.40 We thus compare
our main results on the effect of hidden income on the share of lottery gains
allocated to transfers to kin and non-kin in Table 5, with the results on the share
of total earnings on the same types of transfers41 in Table 7. If the lottery gains
are fully fungible, we should find close results between these two tables. In
the opposite scenario, under non-fungibility of the gains, we should find no
effect or an effect of the opposite sign, driven by the compensation mechanism
highlighted above.
We find comparable effects of the opportunity to hide; the opportunity to hide
decreases the resources allocated to transfers to kin in both cases. The magni-
tude is even remarkably similar for players with a positive WTP to hide (Panel
B): drawing the card allowing the player to hide income decreases the share al-
located to transfers to kin by -6.1 percentage points here in Table 7, versus by
-6.6 percentage points in the main Table 5. Results in transfers to non-kin are
also close in magnitude but are non-significant. Moreover, the shares allocated
to transfers (Panel C) are very similar between the two tables.
This test has strong implications: it suggests that the difference in allocation
choices of public and private resource is not affected by the nature of the wind-
fall nature of the gains, since the same pattern is observed for total income.
6 Heterogeneity analysis
Our results relative to the WTP indicate that preferences for income privacy
strongly differ along the gender dimension and along the median of household
39Note that these questions were asked at the beginning of the questionnaire, with no refer-
ence to the lottery gains. The questions about the use of the lottery gains were asked only at the
very end of the survey.
40For individuals who did not perceive their income in the past seven days (e.g., monthly
earned income), we compute it from the baseline survey.
41We have the information about only the amounts of the five most important transfers made
during those seven days and not about other types of expenditures. Since our main results focus
on transfers, we think that this comparison provides a convincing test on the fungibility issue.
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food expenditures. Here, we explore how sub-groups, defined along these two
dimensions, allocate their resources when given the opportunity to hide income.
Also, we consider separately transfers made to individuals within the household
and transfers made to kin members in the community to disentangle the effect
depending on the strength of family ties.
6.1 Refining transfers within kin networks and wealth het-
erogeneity
An interesting question to raise is whether the decrease in transfers to kin con-
cerns transfers made to household members or to kin outside the household. In
Panel A of Table 12 in the Appendix section, we re-estimated model 5.2 dis-
tinguishing transfers to kin within household (column (5)) from transfers to kin
outside the household (column (6)).
We also investigate the heterogeneity of the effect at the median household daily
food consumption per capita in Panels B and C of the same table. The median
is 420 FCFA and the mean daily household food consumption per capita for the
sample below the median is 301 FCFA, while for the sample above the median,
it is more than the double: 696 FCFA. Hence, for an individual in the lower
part of the distribution, the lottery gains represent almost a month of his or her
own daily consumption, while for someone above the median, this represents
only 13 days. Since the willingness-to-pay to hide income is twice higher in
relative terms for poorer individuals, we may thus expect that receiving the gains
in public or in private induces differential effects on how people spend their
income on these two subsamples. Moreover, in Panels B2 and C2, we restrict
the considered samples to the individuals with a positive WTP to hide.
A first observation is that individuals who have a positive WTP and who are
given the opportunity to hide actually decrease the share of transfers made to
kin outside the household and not transfers to household members (Panel A2).
This holds true for individuals below the median consumption level (Panel B2),
but not for those above it (Panel C2), although the coefficient remains nega-
tive. Income privacy enables individuals to re-allocate resources to the benefit
of health expenditures for the poorest (Panel B2) and of personal expenditure
for the richest (Panel C2). A new result pertains to the investment choice made
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by poorest individuals: we find that the investment share is decreased by the
opportunity to hide among individuals willing to hide (Panel B2). It seems that
investing in inputs is part of a strategy to keep more control over one’s resources
and to lessen the pressure to redistribute42; hence, getting the opportunity to hide
make this strategy redundant.
6.2 Gender analysis
Following on these results, we further explore the heterogeneity by gender in
Tables 11 and 13 in the Appendix section, for men and women respectively. For
women, we also split the sample by household economic position (Panels B and
C).43
Concerning men, Table 11 shows that in Panel B, men who are willing and able
to hide decrease their transfers to kin outside the household by 8.3 percentage
points relative to men with the same preferences but who did not get the oppor-
tunity to hide. This accounts for a decrease of 88% of the share, meaning that
they almost stop transferring outside the household. Within the household, the
coefficients for transfers and for household non food expenditures are both not
significant but quite large (between 4 and 5 percentage points each); consider-
ing the sum of the two types of expenditures within the household, we find a
decrease of 9 percentage points significant at 10 percent level.44 This means
that men who are willing to hide and got the opportunity to do so drastically
decrease their transfers and expenses for kin both within and outside the house-
hold. The funds released through this decrease in transfers allows men to spend
more on personal expenditures — we find an increase by 8 percentage points.
Regarding the female sample, when looking at Panel A of Table 13, we find
no significant effect of the opportunity to hide neither on transfers to kin —
although the sign is negative —, nor on personal expenditure — the sign is posi-
tive. However, we find a weak negative effect on the share devoted to investment
purchases among women who were willing to pay to hide income (Panel A2).
Though, we understand from Panels B and C that the behaviors seem strongly
42Some qualitative evidence of such type of coping strategies is provided in (Boltz and Villar,
2013).
43The smaller size of the sample of men does not allow us to conduct this analysis on men.
44Results are not shown but available upon request.
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heterogeneous among women depending on the position in the consumption dis-
tribution. Indeed, most of the results of Panel A are driven by poorer women
(Panel B1) and especially by those with a positive WTP (Panel B2). While all
women below the median decrease their transfers to kin outside the household
by 3.2 percentage points; this effect reaches 4.8 percentage points for women in
this sample with a positive WTP to hide. The latter group of women decreases
dramatically the share devoted to investment by 11.5 percentage points. The
combination of these two effects on transfers to kin outside the household and
on investment raises a natural subsequent question about where these women
reallocate this extra money. Though we find no significant effect, women seem
to spend more on personal and health, on transfers and food in the household,
and on transfers to neighbors. From this analysis, we see that the poorer women
are the most responsive to the offered strategy to hide income: they seem to try
to escape the pressure to redistribute from kin living in the community so as to
spend more for themselves and their households. Alternatively, when they are
not offered the opportunity to hide they invest a larger share of their income,
suggestive of an alternative strategy to avoid redistributive pressure.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing but still scarce literature on the potential
adverse effects of informal redistribution in developing economies. It sheds
light on the possible causes of poverty traps in sub-Saharan Africa. Our paper
is the first to both identify the hidden cost of informal redistribution, through
the WTP to hide income from peers, and to link it to the effect of redistributive
obligations on resources allocation within and between households. We rely on
an original experiment conducted in dense urban areas in Senegal that combines
a lab-in-the-field and a randomized controlled trial.
First, the widespread and high WTP to hide income provides us with an estimate
of the deadweight loss associated with the redistributive pressure: two-thirds of
the experiment participants were willing to escape from the redistributive and
subsequently willing to forgo up to 14% of their income to keep them hidden
from peers. We find that redistributive pressure comes the extended family, es-
pecially from kin living in the community relative to direct household members.
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Second, offering people the opportunity to keep income unobservable reduces
by 27% the share of income they transfer to to kin, and symmetrically increases
personal and health expenditures. Interestingly, women avoid only redistribu-
tion towards kin outside the household, while men decrease their contributions
to both household members and other kin. This goes in line with the traditional
role of men as main contributors to household expenditures while women are
more active in larger kinship networks, through their (financial) participation in
events such as ceremonies (Boltz and Villar, 2013). Another important result
is that when given the opportunity to hide, women in poorest households de-
crease drastically their share devoted to the purchase of productive assets. This
suggests that investing in small inputs represents for these women an alternative
strategy to gain more control over their resources.
The strong WTP for income privacy and the considerable effects income hiding
induces on resource allocation point to the importance of designing adequate
financial products such as savings, especially when they would protect individ-
uals secrecy from other household or kin members and offer more control over
their resources. A formal insurance scheme that can offer at least as good in-
surance coverage as the extended family would allow a large majority of the
population to save 14% of their revenues. This is all the more important since
the population at stake are also the most vulnerable groups. In the light of the
result for poor women making small daily investments that do not allow them
to improve their economic conditions, offering them a safe, unobserved savings
device would enable them to capitalize for a larger investment and help them to
escape this poverty trap. However, further research is needed to capture the gen-
eral equilibrium effects, including the benefits of social redistribution in terms
of risk-sharing as well as the distortionary costs identified here. Understand-
ing the linkages between formal and informal institutions would help to assess
the effects of introducing a large-scale insurance scheme in economies with
predominant family-provided insurance. Therefore, this paper calls for further
research investigating the welfare gains associated with the design of adequate
financial products, e.g. savings accounts, that offer individuals more control
over their resources.
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Table 8: Full lottery sample, Private and Public lottery cards subsamples
Full sample Private card Public card Diff.
N Mean N Mean N Mean P-val.
(0) (1) (2) (1)-(2)
Experimental variations
Selected with another household member 816 0,65 537 0,67 278 0,63 0,29
Any close friend among players 811 0,08 533 0,07 278 0,09 0,31
Any neighbor among players 811 0,79 533 0,79 278 0,79 0,87
Any kin among players 811 0,53 533 0,55 278 0,49 0,15
Individual sociodemographic characteristics
Male 816 0,33 537 0,32 278 0,34 0,57
Age 816 37,40 537 37,72 278 36,74 0,25
Muslim 816 0,96 537 0,97 278 0,94 0,10
Wolof 816 0,46 537 0,48 278 0,41 0,06
No education 816 0,23 537 0,23 278 0,21 0,51
Koranic School 816 0,36 537 0,36 278 0,36 0,92
French/Arabic education 816 0,61 537 0,59 278 0,65 0,13
In a monogamous union 816 0,48 537 0,44 278 0,56 0,00
In a polygamous union 816 0,18 537 0,18 278 0,17 0,50
Single 816 0,23 537 0,26 278 0,19 0,05
Other marital status 816 0,10 537 0,12 278 0,07 0,02
Individual economic characteristics
Informal sector 816 0,86 537 0,85 278 0,87 0,45
Monthly earnings (in log) 810 6,59 531 6,53 278 6,70 0,67
Contributes to household’s food expenses 811 0,42 534 0,43 276 0,38 0,20
Borrower 816 0,41 537 0,42 278 0,38 0,35
Lender 814 0,37 536 0,37 277 0,38 0,71
Owns some cattle 816 0,10 537 0,10 278 0,10 1,00
Owns some poultry 816 0,06 537 0,07 278 0,05 0,13
Individual position in the household
Household head 815 0,20 536 0,21 278 0,17 0,19
Spouse of household head 815 0,25 536 0,25 278 0,26 0,78
Son or daughter of household head 815 0,28 536 0,28 278 0,29 0,90
Sibling of household head 815 0,06 536 0,06 278 0,07 0,55
Eldest in same parent sibship 816 0,25 537 0,26 278 0,24 0,66
Father alive 816 0,43 537 0,43 278 0,44 0,81
Mother alive 813 0,72 535 0,70 277 0,75 0,13
Individual position in the community and extended family
Has always lived in the community 816 0,35 537 0,37 278 0,32 0,22
Has a responsibility in the community 816 0,09 537 0,10 278 0,07 0,09
Can rely on someone in household 816 0,65 537 0,64 278 0,67 0,31
Can rely on someone in neighborhood 816 0,15 537 0,15 278 0,14 0,96
Can rely on someone outside neighborhood 816 0,49 537 0,47 278 0,51 0,31
Anyone in household can rely on him/her 816 0,63 537 0,64 278 0,61 0,39
Anyone in neighborhood can rely on him/her 816 0,22 537 0,21 278 0,23 0,44
Anyone outside neighborhood can rely on him/her 816 0,34 537 0,35 278 0,34 0,81
Household characteristics
Household size 815 11,75 537 11,88 277 11,54 0,47
Share of adult household members 815 0,63 537 0,63 277 0,63 0,96
Share of female household members 815 0,52 537 0,51 277 0,53 0,12
Household daily food consumption p.c. (log) 812 6,09 536 6,09 275 6,11 0,57
House is rented 816 0,33 537 0,35 278 0,29 0,13
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Table 9: Distribution of cards in the lottery
Public cards Private cards Total
LowPublicNO HighPublicNO Private f ree,NO Private p200,O Private p700,O
Option cards (O) No No No Yes Yes
Draws from lotery:
Frequency 106 166 155 186 184 797
Percentage 13.3% 20.8% 19.5 % 23.3% 23.1% 100%
NO stands for “no-option” cards, O stands for “option” cards.
Table 10: Distribution of gains for option cards
Choice made at given price
Card Price Option A (All public) Option B (Partly private) Total
Private p200,O 200 FCFA
Frequency 80 106 186
Percentage∗ 43.0% 57.0% 100%
Private p700,O 700 FCFA
Frequency 93 91 184
Percentage∗ 50.5% 49.5% 100%
∗ It corresponds to the percentage of individuals having chosen option A (respectively B) for a given card
and at the corresponding price level. The difference between the take-ups for price=200 and p=700 is not
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
NP stands for “not preference-based”, P stands for “preference-based”.
Table 11: Effect of the opportunity to hide gains on transfers & allocation
choices
Sample: Men
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Hh members Other kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A (N=204): All men
Card with opportunity to hide 5.452 2.274 0.957 −4.251 0.970 −4.984 −0.107 0.536 0.005
(4.091) (2.471) (6.039) (4.102) (3.934) (2.530) (1.773) (3.579) (2.858)
R2 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.14
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.05 0.17
Panel B (N=140): Men with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 8.024 2.871 −0.037 −4.055 −4.966 −8.297 −0.385 3.030 0.731
(4.915) (2.966) (6.868) (5.055) (4.613) (3.293) (2.234) (3.880) (3.396)
R2 0.20 0.12 0.25 0.18 0.32 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.13 0.91 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.01
Panel C (N=140): Unconditional means
Public cards (N=51) 11.218 1.089 31.997 12.738 16.267 6.427 3.721 5.413 4.357
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=35) 9.749 1.587 32.18 12.385 21.164 9.365 4.166 1.429 4.444
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=16) 14.432 0 31.597 13.511 5.556 0 2.748 14.13 4.167
S.e. in (). Panels A & B: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: men. In all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Pane B: men with positive WTP to hide income. Panel C presents unconditional
means.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors. Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
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Table 12: Effect of the opportunity to hide lottery gains on transfers &
allocation choices
Sample: all individuals - Below/above median of household food consumption
per capita
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Hh members Other kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: All individuals
Panel A1 (N=654): All
Card with opportunity to hide 3.870 1.318 −0.748 −1.448 −0.260 −1.976 0.424 −1.730 0.377
(2.092) (1.326) (3.028) (2.145) (2.016) (1.170) (0.972) (2.716) (1.475)
R2 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.04
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.00 0.57
Panel A2 (N=433): sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 5.188 2.936 1.407 −3.412 −2.382 −3.229 1.397 −2.808 0.310
(2.689) (1.564) (3.625) (2.577) (2.440) (1.561) (1.268) (3.373) (1.831)
R2 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.06
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.37
Panel A3 (N=433): Unconditional means
Public cards (N=164) 10.754 2.724 26.445 11.495 15.38 4.643 3.144 17.344 3.318
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 10.989 1.784 24.047 12.042 17.769 5.876 2.556 17.361 3.764
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=60) 10.347 4.352 30.601 10.548 11.238 2.504 4.164 17.314 2.546
Panel B: Below median of household daily food consumption
Panel B1 (N=356): All
Card with opportunity to hide 2.378 2.817 −0.519 −1.702 0.250 −2.489 0.334 −3.189 1.199
(2.771) (1.861) (4.180) (2.889) (2.741) (1.394) (1.321) (3.181) (2.197)
R2 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.08
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.06 0.71 0.02 0.60 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.36
Panel B2 (N=230): Sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 4.688 4.446 3.882 −0.765 −0.386 −3.572 0.255 −6.527 −2.034
(3.437) (2.337) (4.974) (3.468) (3.262) (1.711) (1.781) (3.936) (2.768)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.12
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.28
Panel B3: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=89) 11.822 1.81 28.493 11.799 15.583 3.973 2.633 16.011 3.777
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=59) 11.414 1.977 25.436 11.321 17.216 4.802 2.612 16.441 4.896
Panel C: Above median of household daily food consumption
Panel C1 (N=298): All
Card with opportunity to hide 6.220 −0.890 0.780 −0.887 −1.693 −1.978 0.132 −0.532 −1.092
(3.086) (1.852) (4.322) (3.146) (2.928) (1.864) (1.411) (4.327) (1.809)
R2 0.21 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.10
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.88 0.00 0.23
Panel C2 (N=203): Sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 7.497 0.794 −2.024 −3.683 −4.520 −3.589 2.390 −0.055 2.387
(4.180) (1.992) (5.234) (3.701) (3.647) (2.620) (1.728) (5.345) (2.234)
R2 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.15
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.22 0.00 0.16
Panel C3: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=75) 9.486 3.807 24.015 11.134 15.139 5.437 3.752 18.926 2.775
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=45) 10.431 1.531 22.226 12.988 18.494 7.284 2.483 18.568 2.279
S.e. in (). Panels A, B,& C: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: all individuals. In all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panels B (resp. C) correspond to individuals below or equal (resp.
strictly above) to the median of household daily food consumption. Sub-panels A1, B1 & C1: whole sample considered in the corresponding panel, Sub-panels A2, B2 & C2:
sub-sample of women with positive WTP to hide income. Sub-panels A3, B3 & C3: unconditional means.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors. Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
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Table 13: Effect of the opportunity to hide lottery gains on transfers &
allocation choices
Sample: Women - Below/above median of household food consumption per
capita
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Hh members Other kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: All women
Panel A1 (N=450): All
Card with opportunity to hide 3.330 1.073 0.625 −0.950 −0.982 −1.034 0.518 −4.294 0.998
(2.421) (1.575) (3.490) (2.513) (2.320) (1.271) (1.177) (3.590) (1.719)
R2 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.25 0.64 0.04 0.65
Panel A2 (N=293): sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 5.067 2.980 4.910 −4.235 −1.299 −1.355 1.607 −8.375 1.250
(3.279) (1.866) (4.295) (2.967) (2.836) (1.682) (1.569) (4.628) (2.142)
R2 0.13 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.08
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.66 0.05 0.55
Panel A3 (N=293): Unconditional means
Public cards (N=113) 10.544 3.461 23.939 10.934 14.979 3.837 2.884 22.729 2.85
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=69) 11.618 1.884 19.922 11.868 16.047 4.107 1.74 25.443 3.419
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=44) 8.861 5.934 30.239 9.47 13.304 3.415 4.679 18.472 1.957
Panel B: Women below median of household daily food consumption
Panel B1 (N=242): All
Card with opportunity to hide 1.818 3.018 1.388 −1.817 −0.440 −3.194 1.568 −6.065 1.975
(3.248) (2.176) (4.819) (3.261) (3.100) (1.599) (1.642) (4.195) (2.527)
R2 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.11
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.86 0.00 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.30
Panel B2 (N=156): Sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 4.766 3.968 5.294 0.161 1.559 −4.763 2.188 −11.474 −0.668
(4.318) (2.934) (5.777) (3.722) (3.786) (2.062) (2.322) (5.500) (3.129)
R2 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.13
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.06 0.48 0.00 0.69
Panel B3: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=61) 12.566 1.73 25.384 11.02 15.146 4.521 1.906 21.539 3.689
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=39) 12.65 1.567 20.855 10.142 15.883 5.271 1.496 24.587 4.558
Panel C: Women above median of household daily food consumption
Panel C1 (N=208): All
Card with opportunity to hide 6.195 −2.195 −0.925 1.746 −2.082 1.173 −1.151 −2.427 −0.505
(3.348) (2.298) (4.944) (3.900) (3.357) (1.879) (1.687) (5.490) (2.130)
R2 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.09 0.25 0.16
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.82 0.00 0.05
Panel C2 (N=137): Sub-sample with WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 8.493 0.135 −0.044 −4.913 −3.466 2.423 1.062 −6.775 4.133
(4.776) (2.130) (6.458) (4.672) (3.995) (2.533) (2.025) (6.902) (2.778)
R2 0.32 0.15 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.26
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.01
Panel C3: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=52) 8.172 5.491 22.244 10.833 14.783 3.034 4.032 24.124 1.866
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=30) 10.276 2.296 18.709 14.111 16.259 2.593 2.057 26.556 1.937
S.e. in (). Panels A, B,& C: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: women. In all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panels B (resp. C) correspond to women below or equal (resp. strictly above)
to the median of household daily food consumption. Sub-panels A1, B1 & C1: whole sample considered in the corresponding panel, Sub-panels A2, B2 & C2: sub-sample of
women with positive WTP to hide income. Sub-panels A3, B3 & C3: unconditional means.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors. Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
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9 Online Appendix
9.1 Appendix A: Protocole
Figure 1: Schema of the experiment in four steps
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Table 14: Attrition between baseline and lab phase
Samples Baseline Lab Attrited Diff.
N Mean N Mean N Mean P-values
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (2)-(3)
Experimental variations
Selected with another household member 922 0.64 816 0.65 106 0.55 0.03
Individual sociodemographic characteristics
Male 922 0.35 816 0.33 106 0.48 0.00
Age 932 37.07 826 37.44 106 34.15 0.01
Muslim 922 0.96 816 0.96 106 0.95 0.79
Wolof 922 0.46 816 0.46 106 0.48 0.66
No education 922 0.22 816 0.23 106 0.17 0.19
Koranic schooling 947 0.36 841 0.35 106 0.42 0.20
French/Arabic education 947 0.60 841 0.59 106 0.68 0.09
In a monogamous union 922 0.48 816 0.48 106 0.49 0.86
In a polygamous union 922 0.17 816 0.18 106 0.08 0.02
Single 922 0.25 816 0.23 106 0.38 0.00
Other marital status 947 0.09 841 0.10 106 0.05 0.09
Individual economic characteristics
Informal sector 947 0.82 841 0.83 106 0.74 0.01
Monthly revenues (in log) 915 6.58 810 6.59 105 6.45 0.80
Contributes to household’s food expenses 924 0.41 821 0.42 103 0.37 0.34
Borrower 921 0.39 816 0.41 105 0.30 0.03
Lender 919 0.38 814 0.37 105 0.40 0.62
Owns some cattle 922 0.11 816 0.10 106 0.18 0.02
Owns some poultry 922 0.07 816 0.06 106 0.11 0.07
Individual position in the household
Eldest in same-parent sibship 922 0.25 816 0.25 106 0.23 0.54
Household head 921 0.19 815 0.20 106 0.18 0.70
Spouse of household head 921 0.24 815 0.25 106 0.20 0.25
Son or daughter of household head 921 0.29 815 0.28 106 0.33 0.33
Sibling of household head 921 0.06 815 0.06 106 0.06 0.85
Father alive 922 0.44 816 0.43 106 0.51 0.12
Mother alive 919 0.72 813 0.72 106 0.76 0.32
Individual position in the community and extended family
Has always lived in the community 922 0.35 816 0.35 106 0.32 0.51
Has a responsibility in the community 922 0.09 816 0.09 106 0.06 0.23
Can rely on someone in household 922 0.63 816 0.65 106 0.51 0.01
Can rely on someone in neighborhood 922 0.15 816 0.15 106 0.14 0.91
Can rely on someone out of neighborhood 922 0.48 816 0.49 106 0.44 0.42
Anyone in household can rely on him/her 922 0.63 816 0.63 106 0.66 0.51
Anyone in neighborhood can rely on him/her 922 0.22 816 0.22 106 0.25 0.36
Anyone outside neighborhood can rely on him/her 922 0.35 816 0.34 106 0.44 0.04
Household characteristics
Household size 930 11.49 825 11.73 105 9.60 0.00
Share of adult household members 929 0.63 825 0.63 104 0.68 0.01
Share of female household members 929 0.52 825 0.52 104 0.50 0.31
Household daily food consumption p.c. (log) 926 6.12 822 6.10 104 6.28 0.00
House is rented 947 0.32 841 0.32 106 0.29 0.50
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Table 15: Attrition between lab phase and post-lab interviews
Lab Post-lab Attrited Diff.
Samples N Mean N Mean N Mean P-values
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (2)-(3)
Experimental dimensions
Positive WTP to hide 797 0.65 772 0.66 25 0.52 0.16
PrivateO,A 797 0.22 772 0.22 25 0.08 0.09
PrivateO,B 797 0.25 772 0.24 25 0.32 0.39
Private f ree,NO 797 0.19 772 0.20 25 0.16 0.66
HighPublicNO 797 0.21 772 0.21 25 0.16 0.55
LowPublicNO 797 0.13 772 0.13 25 0.28 0.03
Selected with another household member 797 0.65 772 0.66 25 0.52 0.15
Any close friend among players 793 0.08 768 0.08 25 0.08 0.97
Any neighbor among players 793 0.79 768 0.79 25 0.76 0.69
Any kin among players 793 0.53 768 0.53 25 0.52 0.93
Individual socio- demographic characteristics
Male 797 0.32 772 0.32 25 0.56 0.01
Age 797 37.42 772 37.27 25 42.20 0.03
Muslim 797 0.96 772 0.96 25 0.96 1.00
Wolof 797 0.46 772 0.46 25 0.48 0.82
No education 797 0.23 772 0.23 25 0.16 0.42
Koranic schooling 797 0.36 772 0.35 25 0.52 0.09
French/Arabic education 797 0.61 772 0.61 25 0.68 0.47
In a monogamous union 797 0.48 772 0.48 25 0.48 0.98
In a polygamous union 797 0.18 772 0.18 25 0.24 0.45
Single 797 0.23 772 0.24 25 0.20 0.68
Other marital status 797 0.10 772 0.10 25 0.08 0.73
Individual economic characteristics
Informal sector 797 0.86 772 0.86 25 0.84 0.78
Monthly revenues (in log) 791 6.57 767 6.54 24 7.59 0.35
Contributes to household’s food expenses 792 0.42 767 0.41 25 0.56 0.14
Borrower 797 0.41 772 0.41 25 0.24 0.09
Lender 795 0.37 770 0.37 25 0.40 0.78
Owns some cattle 797 0.10 772 0.10 25 0.20 0.10
Individual position in the household
Household head 796 0.19 771 0.19 25 0.28 0.25
Spouse of household head 796 0.25 771 0.25 25 0.24 0.90
Son or daughter of household head 796 0.29 771 0.29 25 0.24 0.58
Sibling of household head 796 0.06 771 0.06 25 0.08 0.61
Eldest in same-parent sibship 797 0.25 772 0.25 25 0.24 0.89
Father alive 797 0.43 772 0.43 25 0.44 0.92
Individual position in the community and extended family
Has always lived in the community 797 0.35 772 0.35 25 0.32 0.77
Has a responsibility in the community 797 0.09 772 0.09 25 0.12 0.58
Can rely on someone in household 797 0.65 772 0.66 25 0.52 0.16
Can rely on someone in neighborhood 797 0.14 772 0.14 25 0.20 0.42
Can rely on someone outside neighborhood 797 0.49 772 0.49 25 0.40 0.37
Anyone in household can count on him/her 797 0.63 772 0.63 25 0.76 0.18
Anyone in neighborhood can rely on him/her 797 0.22 772 0.21 25 0.28 0.43
Anyone outside neighborhood can rely on him/her 797 0.34 772 0.34 25 0.36 0.82
Household characteristics
Household size 796 11.78 771 11.79 25 11.52 0.84
Share of adult household members 796 0.63 771 0.63 25 0.64 0.66
Share of female household members 796 0.52 771 0.52 25 0.48 0.17
Household daily food consumption p.c. (log) 793 6.09 769 6.09 24 6.12 0.79
House is rented 797 0.33 772 0.33 25 0.44 0.23
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9.2 Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
9.2.1 Estimation of the price elasticity for income privacy
The probability that subject i chooses to pay p, when p lies in {0,200,500,700,
1000}, takes a standard logit form.45 We estimate a panel random effect logit
model, since each individual was asked to choose option A or B for five different
prices; the random individual intercept ζi captures the combined effect of all
omitted subject-specific covariates that cause some subjects to be more prone to
choose option B. This model allow us to estimate the price elasticity for income
privacy, controlling for observable characteristics of the subjects.
Table 16 presents the estimation of the price elasticity for income privacy relying
on a panel logit model with random individual effects. We find a demand for
hidden income decreasing with price. Conditional on the reference 0 FCFA
price, the larger the offered price, the lower the probability to hide. Furthermore,
the willingness to hide income decreases more slowly with the price for men
than for women.
Table 16: Willingness to hide income : Random-effect panel logit model
All Women Men
(1) (1w) (1m)
Price = 200 FCFA −3.19∗∗∗ −3.22∗∗∗ −2.39∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.55) (0.75)
Price = 500 FCFA −5.85∗∗∗ −5.61∗∗∗ −5.18∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.68) (0.89)
Price = 700 FCFA −8.19∗∗∗ −7.87∗∗∗ −7.19∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.80) (0.98)
Price = 1000 FCFA −9.43∗∗∗ −9.13∗∗∗ −8.14∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.87) (1.01)
Number of observations 3855 2620 1235
Panel logit with random effect model; Community and time fixed effects
included; robust standard errors in (); ∗p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
Dependent variable: Hideik = 1 if subject i wants to hide at price p= k.
Controls not shown: same controls as in Table 17.
45We assume that the utility, Uik, of subject i for choosing option k = A or B, takes the form
of an additive random utility model (ARUM) (see Hey and Orme (1994) and von Gaudecker et
al. (2011), for modeling of stochastic choices in experimentes) : Uik = Vik+ ζi+ εik, where ζi
is an individual effect normally distributed with variance σ2ζ and εik is an i.i.d. type 1 extreme
value distributed preference shock, with variance σ2ε = pi/3. Vik is the deterministic utility of
choosing option k and is a linear function of observable characteristics Xi and price p: Vik =
αk+X ′i βk+ γk p.
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Figure 2
Figure 3: Relative Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) to hide income by percentiles
of the daily food consumption per capita
9.3 Appendix C: Results on willingness-to-pay to hide
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Table 17: The Determinants of the Willingness-to-pay to hide income
Interval-censored regression model
Maximum WTP to hide† All Women Men
(1) (1w) (1m)
Experimental variations
Selected with another hh member −20.2 −122.8 90.8
(111.8) (120.6) (215.6)
Any known non-kin in the session −14.6 −93.6 87.9
(148.5) (130.9) (331.3)
Any kin in the session (excl. pairs) 285.0∗∗ 450.8∗∗∗ −227.1
(131.7) (133.3) (306.7)
Individual demographics
Male 191.6∗
(105.8)
Age −2.0 −5.4 1.7
(5.1) (6.0) (12.1)
French/Arabic education −64.0 −75.9 −17.7
(105.4) (130.5) (196.1)
Koranic schooling −98.4 −136.7 7.6
(103.9) (113.6) (178.2)
Single 229.6∗∗ 186.4 528.0∗∗
(116.0) (144.1) (244.9)
Individual economic situation
Formal sector −148.5+ −164.0 −86.8
(95.2) (118.8) (254.9)
Average income in last 3 months (log) 12.2∗∗ 15.3∗ 9.6
(6.0) (7.8) (14.0)
Has some savings 108.5 56.5 271.3
(76.4) (109.0) (177.6)
Individual position in the household
Household head 356.7∗∗ 434.6∗ 454.1∗
(170.0) (224.6) (245.5)
Spouse of household head 275.8∗ 274.3∗
(146.2) (151.1)
Child of household head 40.5 −139.3 399.4∗
(143.5) (173.8) (216.3)
Contributes to household food expenses 34.0 −21.3 14.1
(110.8) (116.3) (236.5)
Individual position in the community
Has always lived in this community 192.7 379.4∗∗∗ −306.8
(134.9) (139.9) (248.2)
Has a responsibility in the community −483.4∗∗∗ −84.4 −1296.4∗∗∗
(114.2) (159.6) (289.5)
Any kin leaving in the community −59.2 −23.9 −160.7
(80.3) (69.4) (222.7)
Household characteristics
Household size 14.6 19.7 15.8
(11.5) (12.9) (21.8)
Share of dependent household members (%) −3.6 −7.9∗∗ 8.0
(3.0) (3.2) (6.6)
Household daily food consumption p.c. (log) 209.8∗ 94.0 454.2∗
(121.4) (115.5) (263.7)
House is rented −109.4 −12.1 −422.2∗∗
(107.2) (131.7) (207.2)
Constant −944.5 320.7 −3386.7∗
(785.0) (781.6) (1959.3)
Mean of the WTP to hide (in FCFA) 732.4 651.2 902.7
Number of observations 771 524 247
AIC 7514.2 4916.9 2593.8
Test Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interval-data regression model; standard errors clustered at the session level in ()
+p< 0.12,∗ p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
† Dependent variable: maximum price p willing to pay to hide. It is observed in intervals for a price
p≤ 1000 FCFA: { ]−∞;0[ ; [0;200[ ; [200;500[ ; [500;700[ ; [700;1000[}. The exact price is observed
for price above 1000 FCFA (specific question).
Controls not shown : can read (dummy), Wolof and Muslim dummies.
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Table 18: Willingness-to-pay to hide income
Interval regression model — Below/above the median of household food
expenditures
Sample: all and women only ; all controls shown
Below Median Above Median
All Women All Women
1 1w 2 2w
Experimental variations
Selected with another hh member 151.1 36.0 −134.3 −175.6
(155.1) (161.8) (139.6) (153.2)
Any known non-kin in the session −16.1 9.7 8.5 −104.9
(154.0) (127.0) (257.4) (201.2)
Any kin in the session (excl. pairs) 291.3 405.5∗ 258.5 375.5∗
(222.1) (224.2) (178.9) (208.0)
Individual demographics
Male 45.3 321.8∗
(161.0) (168.7)
Age 5.3 −1.9 −8.8 −11.0+
(6.1) (8.3) (7.6) (7.0)
French/Arabic education −128.2 −211.6 −55.5 15.5
(178.8) (252.8) (149.6) (173.0)
Koranic schooling −53.8 −29.7 −144.3 −157.3
(144.5) (133.9) (123.3) (163.1)
Single 349.7∗ 261.3 130.9 37.5
(194.1) (249.9) (133.4) (212.2)
Individual economic situation
Formal sector −339.0∗∗ −462.4∗∗ −31.2 34.6
(171.8) (219.4) (172.9) (174.9)
Average income in last 3 months (log) 17.8∗ 29.3∗∗ 4.7 5.3
(10.5) (14.2) (12.2) (11.8)
Has some savings 119.4 127.0 159.0 69.0
(95.5) (103.2) (137.1) (148.1)
Individual position in the household
Household head 495.2∗∗ 625.6 310.4 426.7∗
(245.3) (416.0) (229.2) (224.0)
Spouse of household head 86.3 105.5 454.3∗∗ 413.8∗∗
(191.4) (226.1) (214.3) (188.8)
Child of household head −15.4 −224.4 121.5 −3.8
(144.0) (177.1) (190.5) (203.6)
Contributes to household food expenses 49.9 −5.9 8.5 27.3
(156.4) (162.1) (210.9) (181.9)
Individual position in the community
Has always lived in this community 285.5∗∗∗ 442.7∗∗∗ 55.2 235.7
(110.0) (161.0) (198.7) (213.8)
Has a responsibility in the community −245.3 107.7 −662.4∗∗∗ −177.9
(187.1) (316.8) (210.8) (235.1)
Any kin leaving in the community −51.1 −149.8 −61.4 93.6
(137.6) (172.0) (147.6) (134.7)
Household charcteristics
Household size 16.4 17.2 −0.6 25.7
(13.0) (16.4) (18.6) (16.6)
Share of dependent household members(%) −4.2 −11.3∗∗ −4.1 −8.1∗∗
(3.8) (5.1) (4.3) (3.8)
Household daily food consumption p.c. (log) 149.0 28.7 268.6 91.3
(250.9) (311.1) (208.5) (236.0)
Household doesn’t own house −91.6 34.4 −218.8 −26.6
(134.0) (129.6) (166.2) (199.5)
Constant −752.2 387.6 −1139.4 394.5
(1533.3) (1908.1) (1276.9) (1574.6)
Mean of the WTP to hide (in FCFA) 688.5 650 776.1 652.4
Number of observations 386 260 385 264
AIC 3699.9 2391.0 3848.1 2550.0
Test Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interval-data regression model; standard errors clustered at the session level in ()
+p< 0.12,∗ p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗ p< 0.01. Interval-censored data regression model;
† Dependent variable: maximum price p willing to pay to hide. It is observed in intervals for a price p ≤ 1000 FCFA:
{ ]−∞;0[ ; [0;200[ ; [200;500[ ; [500;700[ ; [700;1000[}. The exact price is observed for price above 1000 FCFA (specific
question).
The median daily household food expenditure per capita is 420 FCFA.
Controls not shown : can read (dummy), Wolof and Muslim dummies.
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Table 19: Willingness-to-pay to hide income : Logit model (average marginal
effects)
Maximum WTP to hide† All Women Men
(1) (1w) (1m)
Experimental variations
Selected with another hh member −0.006 −0.004 −0.057
(0.039) (0.045) (0.071)
Any known non-kin in the session 0.027 −0.018 0.130+
(0.042) (0.058) (0.080)
Any kin in the session (excl. pairs) 0.106∗ 0.190∗∗∗ −0.059
(0.057) (0.059) (0.085)
Individual demographic situation
Male 0.024
(0.041)
Age −0.002 −0.003 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
French/Arabic education −0.102∗∗ −0.076 −0.157∗
(0.048) (0.055) (0.094)
Koranic schooling −0.031 −0.046 −0.005
(0.037) (0.046) (0.060)
Single 0.096∗∗ 0.103 0.162∗∗
(0.041) (0.069) (0.082)
Individual economic situation
Formal sector −0.033 0.000 −0.009
(0.032) (0.064) (0.080)
Average income in last 3 months (log) 0.002 0.005 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Has some savings 0.023 0.022 0.042
(0.032) (0.043) (0.071)
Individual position in the household
Household head 0.134∗ 0.172∗ 0.108
(0.070) (0.098) (0.075)
Spouse of household head 0.081∗ 0.088∗
(0.048) (0.054)
Child of household head −0.011 −0.080 0.074
(0.050) (0.072) (0.050)
Contributes to household food expenses −0.023 −0.058 0.014
(0.039) (0.048) (0.077)
Individual position in the community
Has always lived in the community 0.004 0.046 −0.119
(0.044) (0.041) (0.083)
Has a responsibility in the community −0.153∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.346∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.068) (0.072)
Any kin leaving in the community 0.005 0.008 −0.021
(0.031) (0.030) (0.073)
Household characteristics
Household size 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Share of dependent household members (%) −0.002 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
LN household food expendit. p.c. last 3 month 0.040 0.016 0.106
(0.029) (0.041) (0.069)
Household doesn’t own house −0.041 −0.020 −0.099
(0.049) (0.054) (0.086)
Mean of the WTP to hide (in FCFA) 0.65 0.65 0.66
Number of observations 771 524 247
Test Chi-2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Logit model (average marginal effects); Dependent variable : dummy equal to 1 if the WTP is positive ;
standard errors clustered at the session level in ()
+p< 0.12,∗p< 0.10,∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗p< 0.01.
Controls not shown : can read (dummy), Wolof and Muslim dummies.
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9.4 Appendix D: Results on the effect of hidden income
Table 20: Test of correlation between preferences for hidden income and
lottery outcome
Drawing a private card (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WTP to hide ≥ 0 0.042 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.043
(0.235) (0.225) (0.225) (0.245) (0.245)
N 795 795 795 795 795
AIC 1073.1 1120.3 1120.3 1156.5 1156.5
R2 0.0018 0.010 0.010 0.049 0.049
Community and Session-time f.e. X X
Session f.e. X X
Interviewer f.e. X X
Dependent variable: Dummy, drawing a private card versus a control public card. LPM
model. P-values in (); ∗0.1,∗∗ 0.05,∗∗∗ 0.01
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Table 21: The effect of the opportunity to hide lottery gains on allocation
choices
Sample: all individuals - Without controls
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A (N=682): Whole sample
Card with opportunity to hide 2.979 1.228 −0.429 −1.858 −2.176 0.692 −1.420 0.412
(2.112) (1.269) (3.084) (2.080) (2.296) (0.935) (2.723) (1.415)
R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.00 0.19 0.46 0.11 0.75
Panel B (N=448): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 4.261 2.264 1.571 −3.185 −6.326 1.730 −2.156 0.351
(2.682) (1.506) (3.774) (2.478) (2.900) (1.219) (3.417) (1.773)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.64 0.11 0.13 0.58
Panel C (N=234): WTP to hide† < 0
Card with opportunity to hide 1.359 −0.415 −2.762 0.500 4.591 −1.417 −1.175 0.369
(3.408) (2.328) (5.347) (3.796) (3.716) (1.410) (4.471) (2.377)
R2 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.01
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.80 0.98 0.78 0.14 0.03 0.87 0.12 0.98
Panel D (N=682): Testing heterogeneity across WTP to hide†
Card opportunity to hide ×WTP to hide ≥ 0‡ 3.529 2.832 4.455 −3.918 −11.392 2.999 −0.985 −0.107
(4.428) (2.662) (6.467) (4.362) (4.796) (1.959) (5.718) (2.972)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.29 0.45 0.40 0.01 0.05 0.37 0.19 0.87
Panel E: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=164) 10.754 2.724 26.445 11.495 20.7 3.144 17.344 5.599
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 10.989 1.784 24.047 12.042 24.713 2.556 17.361 5.599
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=60) 10.347 4.352 30.601 10.548 13.742 4.164 17.314 5.599
S.e. in (). Panels A, B, C & D: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
‡ Panel D controls for main effects: WTP to hide and card with opportunity to hide lottery gains. The significant interaction term for transfers to kin is identified on the
reference group of 29 individuals who did not get the card with the opportunity to hide, were not willing to hide and did send transfers to kin.
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: in all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panel A and D: whole sample. Panel B (resp. C): sample with positive (resp.
negative) WTP to hide income.
No control variable. Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
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Table 22: Effect of the oppportunity to hide for different levels of the
willingness to pay to hide
Sample: all individuals
Dependant variables: Private Health Household Transfers to Productive Saved gains
Commodity shares Goods Care Food Non-food Kin Non-kin Investment & Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A (N=433): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide 5.168 2.910 1.362 −3.253 −6.568 1.404 −2.831 0.304
(2.689) (1.564) (3.625) (2.568) (2.780) (1.268) (3.373) (1.831)
R2 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.06
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.35
Panel B (N=389): WTP to hide† ≥ 200
Card with opportunity to hide 4.451 2.559 1.186 −4.120 −5.649 1.026 −1.473 0.333
(2.741) (1.529) (3.785) (2.658) (2.948) (1.263) (3.519) (1.916)
R2 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.08
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.17
Panel C (N=333): WTP to hide† ≥ 700
Card with opportunity to hide 5.686 2.312 0.684 −3.868 −7.876 0.540 −1.865 1.502
(3.091) (1.560) (4.030) (2.731) (3.273) (1.419) (3.929) (2.114)
R2 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.09
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.21
Panel D: Unconditional means
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=104) 10.989 1.784 24.047 12.042 24.713 2.556 17.361 5.599
Public cards & WTP >=200 (N=99) 10.982 1.874 24.757 12.65 24.278 2.685 16.105 5.714
Public cards & WTP >=700 (N=82) 11.227 1.694 25.377 11.194 26.208 2.971 16.328 5.069
S.e. in (). Panels A, B, & C: System of linear equations estimated with a SUR model.
† WTP to hide = Willingness to pay to hide (as measured in the lab experiment).
Dependant variables: Share of lottery gains allocated to the various commodities. One column per commodity.
Samples: in all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panel A and D: whole sample. Panel B (resp. C): sample with positive
(resp. negative) WTP to hide income.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors.
Community and time of sessions fixed effects included in all panels and for all outcomes.
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Table 23: Effect of the opportunity to hide on labour supply and income
Sample: all individuals
Labour outcomes over 7 days post lottery Worked (Dummy) Income (in log)
OLS Logit OLS Tobit
Panel A (N=654): Whole sample
Card with opportunity to hide 0.029 0.154 0.151 0.264
(0.038) (0.249) (0.359) (0.518)
R2 0.32 0.35
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B (N=429): WTP to hide† ≥ 0
Card with opportunity to hide −0.055 −0.415 −0.515 −0.775
(0.048) (0.309) (0.457) (0.670)
R2 0.31 0.33
Chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Unconditional means
Public cards (N=161) .634 12683.05
Public cards & WTP >=0 (N=103) .66 12316.71
Public cards & WTP <0 (N=58) .586 13333.62
S.e. in (). Dependant var: Col (1) and (2), worked since the lottery -i.e. in the past 7 days- (dummy), col (3)
and (4), total income earned since lottery-I.e. in past 7 days- (in log). Col (1) and (3) estimated in a linear
regression model, col (2) estimated with a logitistic regression, col (4) estimated with a Tobit regression.
Sample: in all panels, individuals who drew the card 1000 FCFA in public are excluded. Panel A: whole
sample, Panel B: sample with positive WTP to hide income.
Control variables: see Table 5 for the full list of regressors. Community and time-of-session fixed effects
included in all specifications.
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